MP-CFM: MPTCP-Based communication functional module for next generation ERTMS by López Orbe, Igor
MP-CFM: MPTCP-BASED
COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONAL
MODULE FOR NEXT
GENERATION ERTMS
PhD Thesis presented by
Igor Lopez Orbe
Directed by
Marina Aguado Castrillo
TICRM PhD. Program 
2017 
MP-CFM : MPTCP-BASED COMMUN ICAT IONFUNCT IONAL MODULE FOR NEXT GENERAT IONERTMS
phd thesis presented by igor lopez orbedirected by marina aguado castrillo
TICRM PhD. Program2016-2017 Academic Year
Department of Communications EngineeringFaculty of Engineering of BilbaoUniversity of the Basque Country
March 2017
(c)2017 IGOR LOPEZ ORBE
Igor Lopez Orbe: MP-CFM: MPTCP-based Communication Functional Module for
Next Generation ERTMS, TICRM PhD. Program, © March 2017
ABSTRACT
The European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) was originally designed
for the European railways. However, during the last two decades, it has
become a de-facto standard for High Speed Railway (HSR) services in most
of developing countries.
ERTMS is composed of three main components: 1) the European Train Control
System (ETCS) signalling application, 2) Euroradio, which is divided in Safe
Functional Module (SFM) and Communication Functional Module (CFM), and
3) the underlying Global System for Mobile Communications-Railway (GSM-R)
radio technology used as carrier for data exchange between the train and
the Radio Block Centre (RBC) located in ground. The ETCS signalling system
supports three main operational Levels. The Level 3 introduces the possibility
to operate with moving blocks instead of with fixed blocks. This means that
the headway distance between two trains can be adapted reducing it to a
minimal safety distance, therefore increasing the capacity of the corridor. This
distance can be defined as the addition of the breaking distance and the system
signalling delay. Thus, taking into account that the operative of a railway
corridor is conditioned by the message transmission delay and reliability, the
study of the underlying communication systems plays a key role in the ERTMS
evolution. Moreover, a safe operation in ERTMS, from the communication point
of view, can be described as a combination of transmission reliability, channel
availability, transmission delay and message security.
Linked to this fact, the railway industry is working on the digitalisation and
the transition to Internet Protocol (IP) technology of most signalling systems.
Aligned with this trend, Union Industry of Signalling (UNISIG) has recently
released a new communication model for ERTMS which includes an IP-based
operation mode additionally to the Circuit Switching (CS)-based one.
This thesis is aligned with this migration context and it aims to provide a
contribution for the definition of the Next Generation ERTMS, increasing the
availability, reliability and security, as well as, taking into account the delay as
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a basic constrain. There are three main challenges detected to be strengthened
in the definition of the communication architecture of the Next Generation
European Rail Traffic Management System (NGERTMS): 1) improvement in the
survivability against end-to-end channel disruptions; 2) overcome the current
limitation of ERTMS in its Packet Switching (PS) mode to operate with High
Priority (HP) messages by providing them higher resiliency and lower delay
comparing to the regular messages; and 3) the improvement of the security in
ERTMS and the increase of the communication availability and reliability with
no delay penalisation.
Considering the described concerns, in this thesis we propose a MultiPath
TCP (MPTCP)-based communication architecture which overcomes them
while keeps the backwards compatibility with the PS-based communication
architecture proposed by UNISIG. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first time that a complete communication architecture for the NGERTMS,
which overcomes the mentioned shortcomings, is presented. This architecture
implements four different Class Services, which correspond to regular and HP
messages for two foreseen scenarios; a scenario where the On Board Unit (OBU)
and the RBC have multihoming support and a transitional scenario where RBC
has multihoming support but the OBU has a single network interface.
With the simulations tests carried out in this thesis we validate the
suitability of the proposed communication architecture for the railway domain.
Moreover, this validation demonstrates that the proposed architecture has
considerably higher robustness against channel disruptions comparing to the
UNISIG proposal.
In conclusion, in this thesis we demonstrate that the MPTCP-based
communication architecture accomplishes the main features envisaged for the
NGERTMS; hence the contributions made in this thesis are a step forward in the
process of evolving the European railway signalling system.
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LABURPENA
Burdinbide Trafikoa Kudeatzeko Sistema Europarra (ERTMS, bere ingeleseko
sigletatik), Europako burdinbideetarako soilik diseinatu zen bere hastapenetan.
Hala ere, azkenengo bi hamarkadetan, sistema hau Abiadura Handiko Tren
zerbitzuetako nazioarteko de-facto estandarra bihurtu da.
ERTMS sistema hiru azpisistema nagusitan banatuta dago: 1) Burdinbideen
Kontrolerako Sistema Europarra (ETCS, bere ingeleseko sigletatik) seinalez-
tapen aplikazio moduan funtzionatzen duena; Euroradio sistema, aldi
berean beste bi azpisistemetan banatuta dagoena, Segurtasunerako Modulu
Funtzionala (SFM, bere ingeleseko sigletatik) eta Komunikaziorako Modulu
Funtzionala (CFM, bere ingeleseko sigletatik), eta azkenik, GSM-R sistema,
mezuak elkartrukatzen dituena Tren Barruko Sistemaren (OBU, bere ingeleseko
sigletatik) eta Blokeo- eta Kontrol-Zentroaren (RBC, bere ingeleseko sigletatik)
artean. ETCS seinaleztapen sistemak hiru maila ezberdinetan funtziona dezake,
bakoitzak ahalbidetutako gaitasunak ezberdinak direlarik. Hirugarren mailan
trenen posizioa kontrolatzeko bloke mugikorrak erabiltzea ahalbidetzen du,
burdinbidearen bloke finkoak erabili beharrean. Hau horrela izanda, bi
trenen arteko distantzia zerbitzuaren segurtasuna bermatzen duen minimo
batera gutxitu daiteke, korridorearen kapazitatea handituz. Distantzia hau
trenaren balaztatze distantzia eta seinaleztapenen komunikazioen atzerapena
konbinatuz zehaztu daiteke. Beraz, esan daiteke erlazio zuzen bat dagoela
burdinbidearen kapazitatearen eta komunikazioen atzerapenaren eta fida-
garritasunaren artean. Hau dela eta, ERTMS sistemaren komunikazioen
hobekuntzaren azterketa, sistema horren garapenean funtsezkoa da. Halaber,
ERTMS sistemaren gaineko operazio seguru bat, komunikazioen ikuspuntutik,
komunikazio hauen fidagarritasunagatik, komunikazio kanalen erabilgarri-
tasunagatik, komunikazioen atzerapenagatik eta mezuen segurtasunagatik
baldintzatuta dago.
Hau guztiarekin lotuta, tren industriak seinaleztapen sistemen digital-
izazioan eta IP teknologiarako trantsizioan murgilduta dago. Izan ere,
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UNISIG partzuergo industrialak orain dela gutxi komunikazio arkitektura
berria argitaratu du ERTMS sistemarentzat, zeinak zirkuitu-kommutazioetan
oinarrituta dauden komunikazioekin bakarrik ez, IP teknologian oinarritutako
sistemekin ere lan egitea ahalbidetzen duen.
Tesi hau ERTMS sistemaren migrazioarekin lerrokatuta dago eta bere
helburua hurrengo belaunaldiko ERTMS (NGERTMS moduan izendatu
duguna) sistemaren definizioan laguntzeko asmoarekin, komunikazioen se-
gurtasuna, fidagarritasuna eta erabilgarritasuna bermatuko duen komunikazio
arkitektura berria proposatzea da, beti ere mezuen elkartrukearen atzerapena
kontuan izanda. Testuinguru honetan, hiru erronka nagusi detektatu dira
NGERTMS komunikazioen erresilientzia indartzeko: 1) konexio mozketen
aurrean komunikazioen biziraupena hobetzea; 2) egungo IPren gaineko ERTMS
arkitekturak, lehentasun handiko mezuekin lan egiteko dituen mugak gainditu,
hauei erresilientzia maila altuagoa eta atzerapen baxuagoa bermatuz; eta 3)
komunikazioen segurtasuna eta erabilgarritasuna handitu inolako atzerapen
kalte-ordainik jasan barik.
Aipatutako erronkak kontutan izanda, tesi honetan MPTCP protokoloan
oinarritutako komunikazio arkitektura berria proposatzen da ERTMS sis-
temarentzat, MP-CFM moduan izendatu dana. Arkitektura honek erronka
horiek gainditzea lortzen du, baita IP teknologian oinarritutako ERTMS
egungo arkitekturarekin bateragarritasuna bermatzea ere. Momentura arte,
hau da lehen aldia erronka hauek gainditzeko kapaza den honelako
arkitektura bat plazaratzen dela. Arkitektura honek lau zerbitzu klase
mota inplementatzen ditu, bi zerbitzu mota lehentasun handiko mezuentzat
eta beste bi lehentasun normaleko mezuentzat. Halaber, horietako bi
OBUa eta RBCa interfaze aniztunak diren eszenatokietarako diseinatuak
daude, eta beste biak RBCa interfaze aniztuna den, baina OBUa interfaze
bakarrekoa den eszenatokietarako. Proposatutako komunikazio arkitektura
hau, honetarako espresuki diseinatutako sare simulatzaile baten bitartez,
balidatua izan da. Are gehiago, egindako simulazioek frogatzen dute, kanal
interferentzien aurrean gure proposamenak, UNISIG plazaratutakoarekin
alderatuta, sendotasun askoz handiagoa erakusten duela. Tesi honen emaitzak
kontutan izanda, ondorioztatu daiteke MPTCP protokoloan oinarritutako
arkitekturak NGERTMSrako guk hasieran finkatutako baldintza zorrotzak
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betetzen dituela. Ondorioz, proposamen hau aurrerapauso garrantzitsua da
burdinbide seinaleztapenaren garapenaren baitan.
ix

RESUMEN
El Sistema Europeo de Gestión del Tráfico Ferroviario (ERTMS, por sus siglas
en inglés), fue originalmente diseñado para los ferrocarriles europeos. Sin
embargo, a lo largo de las dos últimas décadas, este sistema se ha convertido
en el estándar de-facto para los servicios de Alta Velocidad en la mayoría de
países desarrollados.
El sistema ERTMS se compone de tres subsistemas principales: 1) el Sistema
de Control Ferroviario Europeo (ETCS, por sus siglas en inglés), que actúa
como aplicación de señalización; 2) el sistema Euroradio, que a su vez está
dividido en dos subsistemas, el Módulo de Seguridad Funcional (SFM, por
sus siglas en inglés), y el Módulo de Comunicación Funcional (CFM, por
sus siglas en inglés); y 3) el sistema de comunicaciones subyacente, GSM-R,
que transporta la información intercambiada entre el sistema embarcado en
el tren (OBU, por sus siglas en inglés) y el Centro de Bloqueo por Radio
(RBC, por sus siglas en inglés). El sistema de señalización ETCS soporta tres
niveles dependiendo del nivel de prestaciones soportadas. En el nivel 3 se
introduce la posibilidad de trabajar con bloques móviles en lugar de bloques
fijos definidos en la vía. Esto implica que la distancia de avance entre dos trenes
consecutivos puede ser reducida a una distancia mínima en la que se garantice
la seguridad del servicio, aumentando por tanto la capacidad del corredor
ferroviario. Esta distancia de seguridad viene determinada por la combinación
de la distancia de frenado del tren y el retraso de las comunicaciones de
señalización. Por lo tanto, se puede afirmar que existe una relación directa
entre los retrasos y la confiabilidad de las transmisiones de las aplicaciones de
señalización y la capacidad operacional de un corredor ferroviario. Así pues,
el estudio y mejora de los sistemas de comunicaciones utilizados en ERTMS
juegan un papel clave en la evolución del sistema ERTMS. Asimismo, una
operatividad segura en ERTMS, desde el punto de vista de las comunicaciones
implicadas en la misma, viene determinada por la confiabilidad de las
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comunicaciones, la disponibilidad de sus canales de comunicación, el retraso
de las comunicaciones y la seguridad de sus mensajes.
Unido este hecho, la industria ferroviaria ha venido trabajando en la
digitalización y la transición al protocolo IP de la mayor parte de los sistemas
de señalización. Alineado con esta tendencia, el consorcio industrial UNISIG
ha publicado recientemente un nuevo modelo de comunicaciones para ERTMS
que incluye la posibilidad, no solo de operar con el sistema tradicional,
basado en tecnología de conmutación de circuitos, sino también con un nuevo
sistema basado en IP. Esta tesis está alineada con el contexto de migración
actual y pretende contribuir a mejorar la disponibilidad, confiabilidad y
seguridad de las comunicaciones, tomando como eje fundamental los tiempos
de transmisión de los mensajes, con el horizonte puesto en la definición de
una próxima generación de ERTMS, definida en esta tesis como NGERTMS.
En este contexto, se han detectado tres retos principales para reforzar la
resiliencia de la arquitectura de comunicaciones del NGERTMS: 1) mejorar
la supervivencia de las comunicaciones ante disrupciones; 2) superar las
limitaciones actuales de ERTMS para enviar mensajes de alta prioridad sobre
tecnología de conmutación de paquetes, dotando a estos mensajes de un mayor
grado de resiliencia y menor latencia respecto a los mensajes ordinarios; y
3) el aumento de la seguridad de las comunicaciones y el incremento de la
disponibilidad sin que esto conlleve un incremento en la latencia.
Considerando los desafíos previamente descritos, en esta tesis se propone
una arquitectura de comunicaciones basada en el protocolo MPTCP, llamada
MP-CFM, que permite superar dichos desafíos, a la par que mantener la
retrocompatibilidad con el sistema de comunicaciones basado en conmutación
de paquetes recientemente propuesto por UNISIG. Hasta el momento, esta es
la primera vez que se propone una arquitectura de comunicaciones completa
capaz de abordar los desafíos mencionados anteriormente. Esta arquitectura
implementa cuatro tipos de clase de servicio, los cuales son utilizados por
los paquetes ordinarios y de alta prioridad para dos escenarios distintos; un
escenario en el que ambos extremos, el sistema embarcado o OBU y el RBC,
disponen de múltiples interfaces de red; y otro escenario transicional en el cual
el RBC sí tiene múltiples interfaces de red pero el OBU solo dispone de una
única interfaz. La arquitectura de comunicaciones propuesta para el entorno
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ferroviario ha sido validada mediante un entorno de simulación desarrollado
para tal efecto. Es más, dichas simulaciones demuestran que la arquitectura
propuesta, ante disrupciones de canal, supera con creces en términos de
robustez el sistema diseñado por UNISIG. Como conclusión, se puede afirmar
que en esta tesis se demuestra que una arquitectura de comunicaciones basada
de MPTCP cumple con los exigentes requisitos establecidos para el NGERTMS
y por tanto dicha propuesta supone un avance en la evolución del sistema de
señalización ferroviario europeo.
xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A PhD work is similar to a mountain, before arriving to the peak, many partial
steps have to be made and in each of these steps you receive the support of
many colleagues, without whose help the peak could be hardly reached.
En este sentido mi más sentido agradecimiento a mi directora Marina
Aguado quién en todo momento me ha dado el apoyo que necesitaba,
motivándome en momentos de desánimo y presionándome positivamente
para apuntar siempre un poco más alto. Este agradecimiento lo extiendo al
resto de compañeros del grupo de investigación I2T y en especial a Elias
y Alaitz, compañeros de batallas en este duro proceso que es el doctorado,
quienes además de hacer de psicólogos improvisados, también he compartido
y mejorado ideas y propuestas. Tengo que agradecer también a todos aquellos
que incondicionalmente me han ayudado desde CAF proporcionándome
información y consejo. I am greatly indebted to Marc Antoni, head of the Rail
System Department at the UIC for providing me the opportunity to stay at
the UIC as invited researcher whereby I learnt a lot about the impact of cyber
security in safety services (Merci beaucoup Marc!).
Merci aussi à tous mes amis que j’ai rencontré à Orsay avec qui j’ai ouvert ma
tête à nouvelles réalités et manières de penser, en especial a mi "pata" con quién
he compartido tantas, tan largas y tan diversas conversaciones y reflexiones a
lo largo de estos años, Kankunapac Julio!
Gustatuko litzakit ere eskerrak ematea Zabalduz programaren atzetik egon
diran guztiei eta oro har, euskal unibertsitate publiko bat posible egiten daben
guztiei, askotan ez baikara konturatzen zenbaterainoko pribilegioa dan gaur
egungo munduan ikasteko eskubidea bermatzen dauan unibertsitate publiko
bat izatea.
Eta azkenik, eskertuko nahiko neuke nire familiari, beti han egoteagaitik,
inolako baldintzarik jarri gabe, beti aurpegi on batekin eta behar neban
sostengu moral eta ekonomikoa emateagaitik, zuek gabe hau ez zan posible
izango; Ama, Aita, eskerrik asko!
xv

CONTENTS
List of Figures xxii
List of Tables xxvi
i introduction and motivation 1
1. introduction and context 5
1.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Safety requirements of railway systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Railway signalling systems: Present, past and future . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1. From Telegraph to Control Command Systems . . . . . . 8
1.3.2. Towards a pan-European Railway Signalling System . . 10
1.3.3. Migration towards IP: Challenges and New perspectives 11
1.4. Structure of the document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. revision of ertms and thesis motivation 15
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2. Architecture of Train Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1. ERTMS: Communication Functional Module of Euroradio 17
2.2.2. ERTMS: Safe Functional Module of Euroradio . . . . . . . 21
2.2.3. ERTMS: ETCS application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3. Communication requirements and constrains in the railway
domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4. Analysis of the current ERTMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.1. Shortcomings of GSM-R/General Packet Radio
Service (GPRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.2. Design limitations of Euroradio communication module 34
2.4.3. Analysis of the Euroradio safety module . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5. Summary and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
xvii
xviii contents
2.6. Goals and contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
ii state of the art 45
3. analysis of network resilient protocols 49
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2. From general resilience disciplines to railway signalling needs . 51
3.2.1. Communication redundancy approaches as a basis of
resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3. Solutions applied for similar railway contexts and industries . . 56
3.4. Demanded key features for communication resilient protocol
for Next Generation ERTMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5. Multihoming and multipath solutions for communication
redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.1. Layer 3 proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.2. Layer 3.5 proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5.3. Layer 4 proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.5.4. Layer 5 proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.6. Summary and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
iii proposal for next generation ertms 105
4. proposal of a new cfm for next generation ertms: mp-cfm 109
4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.2. Scenarios of the Next Generation ERTMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2.1. Scenario 1: On-Board Unit and Radio Block Center with
a single interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2.2. Scenario 2: On-Board Unit with a single interface and
multihomed Radio Block Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2.3. Scenario 3: Multihomed On-Board Unit and Radio
Block Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3. Network Requirements to be fulfilled by the proposed
architecture for the NGERTMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3.1. Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
contents xix
4.3.2. Non-functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4. Design assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5. Description of the MP-CFM architecture and its behaviour . . . 116
4.5.1. System architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.5.2. Description of the behaviour: Control plane . . . . . . . . 118
4.5.3. Description of the behaviour: Data plane . . . . . . . . . 123
4.6. Class Services and Packet schedulers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.6.1. Class of service: Class A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.6.2. Class of service: Class D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.6.3. Class of service: Class B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.6.4. Class of service: Class E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.7. Defining the integration of MP-CFM in the NGERTMS protocol
stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.7.1. Mapping of needed primitives with the MPTCP
Application Programming Interface (API) . . . . . . . . . 140
4.7.2. Mapping the MPTCP API to the ERTMS’s SFM . . . . . . . . 144
5. security implications of the proposal 151
5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.2. Robustness limitations of Euroradio Safety layer . . . . . . . . . 152
5.3. Security vulnerabilities introduced by MPTCP . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.4. Overcoming of security problems within the MP-CFM
architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6. path diversity in ertms 163
6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.2. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.3. Network diversity with MPLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.4. Experimentation framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.4.1. Calculation of the network diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.4.2. Used equipment and software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.4.3. Tested scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.5. Experimentation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.5.1. Discussion about the scalability of the proposal . . . . . 173
6.6. Integration of MPTCP with MPLS-PCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
xx contents
iv validation of the proposal 177
7. simulation framework and tools used for the validation 181
7.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.2. Description of Riverbed Modeler simulation tool . . . . . . . . . 182
7.3. Implementation of ERTMS model for Riverbed Modeler . . . . . 182
7.4. Hybrid simulation framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8. parametrisation of the proposal 189
8.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.2. Parametrisation of Class Service B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
8.2.1. Transfer latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.2.2. Loss-recovery Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.3. Parametrisation of Class Service A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8.4. Parametrisation of Class Service D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
8.5. Parametrisation of Class Service E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
9. robustness validation of the proposal 219
9.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
9.2. Definition of the baseline: UNISIG proposal for TCP-based
communication architecture for ERTMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
9.3. Performance overview of the proposal for the transitional
scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
9.3.1. Performance under different burst error lengths . . . . . 223
9.3.2. Performance under different packet error rates . . . . . . 225
9.4. Performance overview of the proposal for the full-multihomed
scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
9.4.1. Performance under different burst error lengths . . . . . 228
9.4.2. Performance under different packet error rates . . . . . . 229
9.5. Discussion about the performance of the proposal . . . . . . . . 231
v conclusions and dissemination results 233
10. conclusions 237
10.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
contents xxi
10.2. Contributions of this research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
10.3. Dissemination of the results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
10.3.1. Publications in international journals . . . . . . . . . . . 239
10.3.2. Publications in proceedings of international conferences 240
10.3.3. Oral communications in industrial conferences . . . . . . 241
10.3.4. Other publications related to this PhD thesis . . . . . . . 241
10.4. Participation in national and international projects . . . . . . . . 242
10.5. Future research lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
vi appendix 245
A. appendix: cyber security threats: a taxonomy 247
A.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
A.2. Passive attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
A.3. Active attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
bibliography 251
L I ST OF F IGURES
1.1. Safety system state machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. Architecture of ERTMS communication model (Source: Unisig
Subset-037 v3.2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3. Functions provided by the Adaptation & redundancy management
Layer Entity (ALE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4. Session establishment of Euroradio Safety protocol . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5. Offline Key distribution system in ERTMS: 1) KTRANS and KKMC
keys distribution; 2) KMAC keys distribution; 3) KSMAC derivation
from KMAC; 4) safe communication using KSMAC. . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6. Online Key distribution system in ERTMS: 1) KTRANS and K-
KMC are replaced by a private/public key pair; 2) KMAC keys
distribution using TLS with the private/public key scheme; 3) the
identity of the parties is checked using a public key infrastructure
scheme; 4) KSMAC derivation from KMAC; 5) safe communication
using KSMAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.7. Sequence diagram for ETCS Level 2 or 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.8. RAMS requirements for a railway resilient system . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.9. Resilience principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.10. Redundancy categorisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.11. Architecture of RaSTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.12. Architecture of Sinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.13. Railway signalling Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.14. Taxonomy of the proposals under analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.15. IPv6 vs ILNP header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.16. GLI-Split addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.17. Chronology graph of layer 3 proposals. s refers to the First
Publication. l refers to the First Standardisation Draft. v refers
to the Standardisation (RFC). N refers to the Last Publications.
Technology by colour: MIPv6, ILNP, GLI-Split, MILSA. . . . . . . . 74
xxii
List of Figures xxiii
3.18. RANGI’s host locator structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.19. Chronology graph of layer 3.5 proposals. s refers to the First
Publication. l refers to the First Standardisation Draft. v refers
to the Standardisation (RFC). N refers to the Last Publications.
Technology by colour: SHIM6, HIP, RANGI, NIIA. . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.20. Chronology graph of layer 4 proposals. s refers to the First
Publication. l refers to the First Standardisation Draft. v refers
to the Standardisation (RFC). N refers to the Last Publications.
Technology by colour: PERM, SCTP, MPTCP, ECCP, MPUDP. . . . 92
3.21. Comparison between traditional RTP flow and Multipath RTP . . . 96
3.22. Comparison between traditional RTP and Multipath RTP protocol
stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.23. Comparison between traditional RTP and MPRTP-AR protocol stack 97
3.24. A point-to-point Multipath Real-Time Transport Protocol Based on
Application-Level Relay (MPRTP-AR) session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.25. Chronology graph of layer 5 proposals. s refers to the First
Publication. l refers to the First Standardisation Draft. v refers
to the Standardisation (RFC). N refers to the Last Publications.
Technology by colour: MPRTP-AR, SIP-based, Strawman, MPRTP. . 101
3.26. Evaluation of the State of the Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.27. Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.28. Communication system architecture for a New Generation ERTMS . 117
4.29. First subflow establishment in MPTCP connection . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.30. Additional subflow establishment in MPTCP connection . . . . . . . 120
4.31. MPTCP connection teardown and subflows closure procedures . . . 122
4.32. Data Sequence Number option of MPTCP header . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.33. Data scheduler for Class A services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.34. Data scheduler for Class D services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.35. Data scheduler for Class B services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.36. Data scheduler for Class E services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.37. Integration of the MPTCP protocol stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.38. Time sequence of the Connection Establishment in the Full-
multihomed scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.39. Time sequence of the Data Transfer in the Full-multihomed scenario 147
xxiv List of Figures
4.40. Time sequence of the Connection Establishment in the Transitional
scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.41. Time sequence of the Data Transfer in the Transitional scenario . . . 149
5.42. MPTCP session hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.43. MITM attack with HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.44. Proposal for an online Key Management System based on e-
commerce systems. (1) KMAC keys are replaced by a private/public
key pair. (2) The KSMAC symmetric key is negotiated during a
TLS session establishment protected by private/public keys. (3) The
identities of validated ERTMS entities are checked using a Public
Key Infrastructure scheme. (4) Safe communication using KSMAC . 160
6.45. Experimentations scenario used for evaluating the proposal under
different network states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.46. Network graph representation used for calculating path diversity . 168
6.47. Captures of network traffic in MPLS network . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.48. Integration of MPTCP with MPLS-PCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.49. ERTMS model for Riverbed Modeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.50. ETCS connection establishment model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.51. Hybrid simulation framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.52. Riverbed Modeler testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.53. RTT value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.54. Nagle algorithm’s effect in transfer latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.55. Delayed Acknowledgement algorithm’s effect in transfer latency . . 193
8.56. Unisig parametrisation vs. Tailored RTOinit and RTOmin . . . . . . . 194
8.57. EWMA effect for obtaining smooth sample values . . . . . . . . . . 196
8.58. Tailoring of α parameter of Jacobson algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
8.59. Tailoring of β parameter of Jacobson algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
8.60. Tailoring of K parameter of Jacobson algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
8.61. Extensive tests of the tailored Jacobson algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.62. Karn’s exponential backoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
8.63. Tailoring of Karn_ f actor parameter of Karn algorithm . . . . . . . . 203
8.64. Extensive tests of the tailored Karn algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
8.65. Loss-recovery latency under different RTT values . . . . . . . . . . . 206
8.66. Evaluation of optimal RTOmin for Class A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
List of Figures xxv
8.67. Evaluation of optimal retransmission algorithm for Class A . . . . . 209
8.68. Availability improvement for Class Service D . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
8.69. Class Service D traffic behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
8.70. Class Service E traffic behaviour for different τ values . . . . . . . . 217
9.71. Comparative analysis of the transitional proposal under different
ABEL values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
9.72. Comparative analysis of the transitional proposal under different
ABEL values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
9.73. Comparative analysis of the transitional proposal under different
error rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
9.74. Comparative analysis of the full-multihoming proposal under
different ABEL values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
9.75. Comparative analysis of the full-multihoming proposal under
different error rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
9.76. Ping-pong effect of regular traffic: 0.1% vs. 10% error rate . . . . . . 231
L I ST OF TABLES
2.1. Summary of parametrisation proposed by UNISIG for Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP)-based ERTMS: Baseline parametrisation . . . . 22
2.2. Summary of key material used in ERTMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3. Proposed KPIs for ETCS over GPRS [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4. Review of potential attacks in ERTMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.5. Performance requirements over GSM-R and GPRS . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.6. Levels and selected resilience mechanisms [2]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.7. Requirement analysis of Layer 3 proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.8. Requirement analysis of Layer 3.5 proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.9. Requirement analysis of Layer 4 proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.10. Requirement analysis of Layer 5 proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.11. Summary of candidate technologies for improving the TCP
performance in railway domain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.12. Functionalities to select the Class Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.13. Requirements and socket options defined for the basic API. Source:
RFC6897 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.14. Requirements defined for the advanced API. Source: RFC6897 . . . . 143
5.15. Summary of terms used in CBC-MAC procedure description . . . . 152
5.16. National and international recommendations for cryptographic
algorithms and key size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.17. All possible paths between node 1 and node 8 and their path
diversity against P0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.18. Testbed setup parameters for the Riverbed Modeler . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.19. Testbed setup parameters for the Hybrid simulation framework . . 186
8.20. Summary of parametrisation for Class A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
9.21. Summary of parametrisation proposed by UNISIG for TCP-based ERTMS221
9.22. Summary of the transitional proposal configuration . . . . . . . . . 223
xxvi
acronyms xxvii
9.23. Summary of the full multihoming proposal configuration . . . . . . 227
ACRONYMS
ERA European Union Agency for Railways
ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System
NGERTMS Next Generation European Rail Traffic Management System
ETCS European Train Control System
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety
EIRENE European Integrated Radio Enhanced Network
SIL Safety Integrity Level
PZB Punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung - Punctiform Train Influencing
AWS/TPWS Automatic Warning System/Train Protection & Warning System
EU European Union
ATP Automatic Train Protection
AWS Automatic Warning Systems
DMI Driver Machine Interface
UNISIG Union Industry of Signalling
CAF Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf
HSR High Speed Railway
OBU On Board Unit
RBC Radio Block Centre
xxviii
acronyms xxix
DA Destination Address
CFM Communication Functional Module
SFM Safe Functional Module
ALE Adaptation & redundancy management Layer Entity
PDP Packet Data Protocol
APN Access Point Name
HP High Priority
ITU-T Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standards Sector
RRE Resilience Requirements for ERTMS
MNOs Mobile Network Operators
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
GSM-R Global System for Mobile Communications-Railway
LTE Long Term Evolution
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
TETRA Terrestrial Trunked Radio
UMTS Universal Mobile Telephone Service
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
FDD Frequency Division Duplex
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
PS Packet Switching
CS Circuit Switching
OSI Open System Interconnection
xxx acronyms
IP Internet Protocol
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
RFC Request For Comments
ISP Internet Service Providers
IT Information Technology
DNS Domain Name System
NAT Network Address Translation
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
AP Access Point
CBTC Communication-Based Train Control
CTMC Continuous Time Markov Chain
RaSTA Rail Safe Transport Application
PRP Parallel Redundancy Protocol
RSTP Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
DDC Deadline Dependent Coding
MN Mobile Node
CN Corresponding Node
SDN Software-Defined Networking
LIS Locator Identifier Split
MIPv6 Mobile IPv6
MIPv4 Mobile IPv4
acronyms xxxi
PMIPv6 Proxy Mobile IPv6
PMIPv6-MAT Proxy Mobile IPv6 - MAG Address Translation
LMA Local Mobility Anchor
MAG Mobile Access Gateway
FMIPv6 Fast Mobile IPv6 Handover
FBACK Fast Binding Acknowledgement
NAR New Access Router
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
MCoA Multiple Care-of Address Registration
ILNP Identifier/Locator Network Protocol
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
GLI-Split Global Locator, Local Locator, and Identifier Split
MILSA Mobility and Multihoming supporting Identifier Locator Split
Architecture
NEMO Network Mobility
HA Home Agent
CoA Care-of Address
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
HIP Host Identity Protocol
RSV RendezVous Server
HIT Host Identity Tag
xxxii acronyms
RANGI Routing Architecture for the Next Generation Internet
HRA Hierarchical Routing Architecture
NIIA Node Identity Internetworking Architecture
Shim6 Site Multihoming by IPv6 Intermediation
REAP Reachability Protocol
ULID Upper-Layer Identifiers
HIT Host Identity Tag
mHIP Multipath Host Identity Protocol
NID Node Identifier
mHIP Multipath Host Identity Protocol
MPTCP MultiPath TCP
SRTT Smoothed Round-Trip Time
RTT Round-Trip Time
SCTP Stream Control Transmission Protocol
CMT Concurrent Multipath Transfer
UDP User Datagram Protocol
MPUDP Multipath UDP
ECCP End-to-end Connection Control Protocol
PERM Practical End-host Multihoming
SACK Selective Acknowledgement
API Application Programming Interface
NC Network Coding
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
acronyms xxxiii
SHIP Hybrid SIP and HIP
MIH Media Independent Handover
SIP-NMS SIP Network Mobility Server
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
MPRTP Multipath Real-time Transport Protocol
MPRTP-AR Multipath Real-Time Transport Protocol Based on
Application-Level Relay
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol
RTCP Real-time Control Protocol
MPTS-AR Multipath Transport System based on Application-level Relay
MPTC Multipath Transport Control
SSSN Subflow-Specific Sequence Number
ISP Internet Service Provider
BTS Base Transceiver Station
DSS Data Sequence Signal
PLR Packet Loss Rate
RTO Retransmission Timeout
ABEL Average Burst Error Length
PMR Path Maximum Retransmission
FR Fast Retransmission
ACK Acknowledgement message
MSS Maximum Segment Size
xxxiv acronyms
TCP-SF TCP Smart Framing
ER Early Retransmission
NC Network Coding
LT Limited Transmit
F-RTO Forward RTO
DSACK Duplicate Selective Acknowledgement
DACK Delayed Acknowledgement
MTU Maximum Transmission Unit
EWMA Exponential Weighted Moving Average
SITL System-in-the-Loop
TLP Tail Loss Probe
FACK Forward Acknowledgement
OS Operating System
MPLS Multi-Protocol Label Switching
LSR Label Switched Router
LSP Label Switched Path
RSVP Resource Reservation Protocol
LDP Label Distribution Protocol
PCE Path Computation Element
TE Traffic Engineering
QoS Quality of Service
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
MAC Message Authentication Code
acronyms xxxv
DES Data Encryption Standard
3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
KMS Key Management System
KMC Key Management Center
DoS Denial of Service
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communications
TIPHON Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization Over
Networks
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
TLS Transport Layer Security
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PSK Pre-Shared Key
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
MITM Man-in-the-middle
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
CA Certification Authority
PTC Positive Train Control
SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
TE Traffic Engineering
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
IGP Interior Gateway Protocols
xxxvi acronyms
RRL Resilient Routing Layer
PCE Path Computation Element
SDN Software Define Networking
LER Label Edge Router
LSR Label Switch Router
LSP Label Switched Paths
LDP Label Distribution Protocol
RSVP Resource Reservation Protocol
RTO retransmission timeout
RTT Round-Trip delay Time
RFI Rete Ferroviaria Italiana
PCC Path Computation Client
EPC Evolved Packet Core
RAN Radio Access Network
eNB evolved NodeB
MGEN Multi-Generator
EMI ElectroMagnetic Interference
KPI Key Performance Indicator
MP-CFM MultiPath-Communication Functional Module
SERA Single European Railway Area
Part I
INTRODUCT ION AND MOT IVAT ION

3
laburpena
Dokumentuaren atal honetan burdinbideen seinaleztapen sistemen garapen his-
torikoaren azterketa egiten da, telegrafoan oinarritutako sistemetatik hasita, gidapen
automatikoa ahalbidetzen duten egungo sistema modernoak arte. Gaur egun sistema
hauek digitalitalizazio eta IP protokoloranzko migrazio prozesu baten murgilduta daude.
Migrazio honek bere eragina du ere ERTMS sistema europarrean, abiadura handiko
tren zerbitzuetarako de factoko estandar bihurtu dana. ERTMS hiru bloketan banatuta
dago: Segurtasunerako Modulu Funtzionala edo SFM, Komunikaziorako Modulu
Funtzionala edo CFM eta ETCS seinaleztapen aplikazioa. Atal honetan egiten den
azterketak egungo ERTMSren mugak detektatzea ahalbidetzen digu. Muga horiek, tesi
dokumentu honetan aurkezten diren azterketa eta proposamenak egitea bultzatu dute.
resumen
En esta parte del documento se hace un análisis histórico de la evolución de los
sistemas de señalización ferroviario, comenzando por los sistemas basados en telégrafos
y acabando en los actuales modernos sistemas que permiten la conducción automática.
Estos sistemas están actualmente en pleno proceso de digitalización y migración hacia
sistemas de comunicaciones basados en IP. Esta migración afecta también al sistema
europeo ERTMS que se ha convertido de-facto en el estándar de señalización para
servicios de alta velocidad en la mayoría de países del mundo. ERTMS se compone
de tres bloques principales: el Modulo Funcional de Seguridad o SFM, el Módulo
Funcional de Comunicaciones o CFM y la aplicación de señalización ETCS. El análisis
que se realiza en esta parte nos permite detectar los principales límites del actual sistema
ERTMS. Dichos límites sirven como motivación para abordar los análisis y propuestas
posteriores de este documento de tesis.

1 INTRODUCT ION AND CONTEXT
The major advances in
speed of communication
and ability to interact took
place more than a century
ago. The shift from sailing
ships to telegraph was far
more radical than that from
telephone to email!
Noam Chomsky
1.1 introduction
Railway systems are key elements of mass transit systems in most of developed
countries. Since railway development started in the beginning of the nineteenth
century, its deployment has continuously grown until become the backbone of
the transportation system in many countries.
These systems have two main features that differ from other transport means;
1) the deterministic path that the vehicle can follow in its travel; 2) the slow
braking response of the vehicle due to the mechanical characteristics of steel
rails and wheels used as guidance. This feature implies long brake distances
that exceed the visibility of the train driver [3].
The knowledge of accurate position of the train in the railway and the
reliable communication of braking and moving commands to it are a need
for guaranteeing a safety operation. This need of preserving the security of
travellers and payload have always justified the use of the state of the art
communication technologies in the railway systems, starting with the telegraph
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in the nineteenth century and following with current cellular and satellite
technologies.
In this chapter we look over the evolution of railway signalling systems
emphasising how the communication technology has been adopted for
railway signalling purposes. We also present the current challenges for the
digitalisation and migration towards IP of the railway signalling and the
advantages this migration could provide. Finally, we present how the rest of
this thesis document is structured.
1.2 safety requirements of railway systems
Railway processes involved with the movement of trains, including signalling,
are considered safety-related due to the large amount of human lives involved
in these operations. Basically, the train must be able to move along the track
without risks. To achieve this goal, it is very important to know the accurate
position of the train and all track sections in front of the train have to be clear
and kept clear until the train has completely passed through them.
This condition is commonly achieve by splitting the railway in fixed or
moving blocks in which only one train can be at the same time. The distance
of these blocks can be reduced in order to increase the capacity of the railway
corridor, as long as the following condition is fulfilled: the train must be able
to perform an emergency break at any moment without risk to crash with the next
train in the corridor. The minimum distance that allows two consecutive trains
to operate safely at a desired speed is known as "headway distance".
The norms EN 50126 [4] and IEC 62278 [5] introduce the Reliability,
Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) term for railway. Frequently, this
term is extended to RAMS(S) by adding also the security needs of the system.
This norm, defines the availability as: the ability of a product to be in a state
to perform a required function under given conditions at a given instant of time or
interval. The availability is closely related to the reliability, which is defined in
the norm IEC 61508 [6] as the probability that an item performs its required
function during a time interval. As it can be deduced, the reliability of railway
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components, including the ones related to signalling systems, plays a key role
for ensuring the availability of the railway operations.
The maintainability is defined in the norm EN 50126 as follow: the probability
that a given active maintenance action, for an item under given conditions of use, can
be carried out within a stated time interval when the maintenance is performed under
stated conditions and using stated procedures and resources. Thus, the maintenance
relies more on the operation policy of the railway operator, which has to define
a correct maintenance procedure to repair or replace items when they go out
from their available state, that is, when they fail.
An important term in industrial processes and especially in railways is
the safety. This term refers to protection of the system against hazardous
consequences caused by technical failures and unintentional human mistakes.
Many times the security is also introduced for referring the protection against
hazardous consequences caused by negligent human actions.
An important requirement in railways is the high availability due to its
strong link with safety; the more available the system is, the lower will be
the time operating in degraded mode. Equally, a reliable and in-time operation
is essential for keeping the railway operation in a safety state. In Figure 1.1 a
three-state Markov chain model is illustrated. The default state should be the
Normal state which represents a full operative safety system. From this state
the system can pass to Degraded Mode state or to Unsafe state. The transition
to the first one typically happens due to a hazardous failure of the system. In
this state the system keeps working with capacity and service limitations and
usually many operations are made manually. Therefore, the Degraded Mode state
should be avoided as it increase the probability to make dangerous errors that
can have critical consequences in terms of economy and human lives, deriving
in an Unsafe state. To this Unsafe state can also be passed directly from Normal
state but it is unlikely to happen, due to hazards, if the system is designed with
safety in mind. However, a security breach could allow an attacker to make it
happen. That is why the security and cyber security have such a big importance
in railway systems.
Due to the human lives involved, train control systems must fulfil specific
requirements regarding to RAMS. These requirements are specified in the
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Figure 1.1.: Safety system state machine
railway RAMS standards EN50126 and IEC62278, and they apply to ERTMS [7] to
achieve a fault tolerant system with Safety Integrity Level (SIL)-4.
1.3 railway signalling systems: present, pastand future
1.3.1 From Telegraph to Control Command Systems
At the very beginning of railways everything was made manually and with no
direct communication between stations and trains involved in the procedure.
There was no system to track the train location. The relative location of each
train was deduced based on the temporal delay in-between two consecutive
services. This situation made difficult to increase service frequency in the same
corridor in a safe way for passengers and freight.
Little time after the apparition of the electrical telegraph in the market, the
first railway-dedicated service was set up in 1839 in the Great Western Railway
in England. It permitted nearly instantaneous communication between stations
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which were used to dispatch messages to signalmen for setting switches and
signals by hand in the track.
Some decades later, the use of the telegraph, together with the appearance
of interlocking and electric track circuits, made the automatic track signalling
possible. This signalling was able to detect the presence of a train in a track
section and automatically display a stop signal in the beginning of the section
to be adopted by the incoming train.
As a natural evolution the Automatic Safety Systems, so-called Control
Command Systems, emerged allowing to pass information from track to train.
These systems are present nowadays in most of railway systems around the
world. The communications of these systems can be performed via balises sited
along the track, via cable loops or via radio transmissions [8].
These Safety Systems can be classified in two main groups depending on
their functions:
Automatic Warning Systems (AWS) - Provides warning if the train exits from
protected or safe state, e.g. due to the excess of speed or due to the access
in a track section without the needed movement authority.
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) - The system calculates continuously the
maximum speed of each train for a safe operation and breaks the train
automatically if it exits from safe state.
Throughout the twentieth century more than fifteen different signalling
systems were deployed only in Europe, being the most extended ones the
German Punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung - Punctiform Train Influencing (PZB),
the Belgian Crocodile and the British Automatic Warning System/Train
Protection & Warning System (AWS/TPWS).
Considering these systems were not interoperable between each others,
trains operating cross-border services must had multiple signalling equipment
installed on board. For pan-European services that involved multiple countries
this supposed a significant increase of price and a considerably increase of
operational limitations.
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1.3.2 Towards a pan-European Railway Signalling System
In order to overcome the incompatibility problem mentioned before, at the
end of 90s, the initiative to create a common rail signalling system, the ERTMS,
emerged. The ERTMS was backed by the European Union (EU) and envisaged to
enhance the cross-border interoperability in Europe. This system is composed
of three complementary technical modules: ETCS and GSM-R.
ETCS - This module is the responsible of signalling and traffic control functions.
It includes an ATP and a Driver Machine Interface (DMI) that passes to the
train driver all line-side information electronically, removing the need of
line-side signals that are not visible at high speed operations.
Euroradio - This module is divided in two functional modules, the SFM
and the CFM. The SFM is responsible of addressing safety requirements,
whereas the CFM provides a complete communication architecture which
allows to connect the OBU and the RBC.
GSM-R - This communication module has two main features. On the one
hand, it provides a carrier for transmitting ETCS messages between train
and track. On the other hand, it provides a unified voice communication
service that includes railway specific functionalities such as group calls,
dynamic addressing and high-priority emergency calls.
The ERTMS specification is made and upgraded by the UNISIG group which
is an industrial consortium composed by the most important companies of the
sector, such as Alstom, Ansaldo, Siemens, Thales and Construcciones y Auxiliar
de Ferrocarriles (CAF). These specifications are controlled also by the European
Union Agency for Railways (ERA) which was created by the EU in 2004.
ERTMS was initially designed for the interconnection of European railway
networks. However, during the last years this system has been adopted by many
countries outside Europe [9] and it is becoming a global de facto standard for
high speed railways, being the 46% of deployment contracts from out of Europe
[10].
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1.3.3 Migration towards IP: Challenges and New perspectives
The adoption of ERTMS in railway corridors has been quite recent. However,
the migration of the communication module, GSM-R, towards a more modern
technology has been a hot topic during the last years. This idea has been
motivated by two main factors; the incoming capacity bottleneck because
of the limited data and voice concurrent connection that GSM-R can have
in each cell, and the fact that, from 2030 onwards, the Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM) technology will disappear from the commercial
telecommunication market. As a first step for updating the communication
module, different tests have been carried out over GPRS [11]. The same as GPRS,
all potential candidates to substitute GSM-R as communication technology, are
based on Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) technology.
This migration implies the adoption of PS technology where there are not
dedicated channels for each user. This fact has the advantage of increasing
the capacity with the same spectrum by sharing a common channel among all
users, but also potential disadvantages that must be solved, such as the out-of-
order packet delivery. Additionally, the adoption of IP-based technology implies
the upgrading of the current ERTMS communication protocol stack, as well as
its Safety Layer, Euroradio, which is designed to work with CS technology.
In order to promote a planned migration in Europe, the ERA intends
nowadays to establish a roadmap to define a new communication solution
by 2018 and to start the transition from approximately 2022 [12]. Based on
the current trend of the market, the most likely candidate for substituting
GSM-R is Long Term Evolution (LTE), a fourth generation technology that is
currently being adopted by most of Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) in
Europe. However, considering the different evolution pace of the railway and
telecommunication markets, for the moment of starting the deployment of
LTE in railways, the telecommunication market will be already in the fifth
generation technologies, 5G. Therefore, the flexibility to face market changes
and technology variation across Europe, a multi-technology policy approach
has been presented as the most attractive option [12]. According to [12] this
strategy offers the following advantages:
• It allows new/emerging technologies to be introduced over time.
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• It offers a future-proof approach for the longer term.
• It allows the use of commercial network bearers with associated potential
for cost reduction where appropriate.
• It allows for shared networks in countries where this is viable.
• It allows for private networks in existing spectrum to be retained in areas
where this is considered to be the most appropriate option.
In the same way as the migration towards IP-based technologies, the adoption
of a new multi-technology paradigm needs for a deep research in order to allow
the coexistence and complementary use of multiple technologies by a train, in
the same corridor and at the same time.
1.4 structure of the document
The structure of the rest of this document is divided in the following five parts:
part 1: introduction and motivation - Chapter 2 complements the first
part of the document. It makes a description in depth of current ERTMS, as
well as a critical analysis according to the current perspective and to the
upcoming migration towards IP technology. This chapter highlights the
shortcomings to be overcome by NGERTMS, which justifies the motivation
of the research work of this thesis.
part 2: state of the art - This part is composed of a single chapter,
Chapter 3. In this chapter, we analyse the resilience of network
communications, understood as the ability to recover from network
disruptions, as it encompasses both challenges described above. This
analysis of the state of the art is divided in different Open System
Interconnection (OSI) layers and for each technology a detailed
description is provided followed by a critical analysis of the previously
mentioned requirements. Furthermore, using a semi-quantitative analysis
of previous requirements, we conclude this chapter identifying the most
suitable proposal to be included in the NGERTMS and we highlight the
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open points that should be addressed before its inclusion in the NGERTMS’s
protocol stack.
part 3: proposal for next generation ertms - This part of the doc-
ument proposes in Chapter 4 a new MPTCP-based communication
architecture for the NGERTMS, which improves the survivability against
channel disruptions. Moreover, this proposal presents an integral solution
which incorporates a differentiated treatment of regular and HP messages
in the PS mode. Additionally, in Chapter 5 we evaluate the new security
vulnerabilities that could appear with the adoption of MPTCP-based
communication architecture and we propose techniques within the state
of the art to overcome them. This part of the thesis ends with Chapter
6 that presents a proof-of-concept experiment, which evidences the
potentiality of integrating Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) with
MPLS to provide and-to-end path diversity.
part 4: validation of the proposal - In this part of the document the
validation of the presented proposal is provided. First, in Chapter 7 we
explain in detail the simulation framework used for validation purposes.
After, in Chapter 8 we present the parametrisation of the proposed new
communication architecture for the NGERTMS. Finally, the robustness of
the proposal against channel disruptions is presented in Chapter 9. This
robustness is validated using as a baseline the current communication
architecture proposed by UNISIG.
part 5: conclusions and dissemination results - Last but not least,
in this part, Chapter 10 outlines the conclusions resulted from the
realisation of this thesis and highlights the future works that may derive
from the research work gathered in this document.

2 REV IS ION OF ERTMS ANDTHES IS MOT IVAT ION
To know what you know
and what you do not know,
that is true knowledge.
Confucius
2.1 introduction
ERTMS is the current standard ATP system in Europe. Since this system was
defined, its deployment has grown constantly, especially in new High Speed
lines.
This system was originally attached by design to GSM-R technology. Thus,
current ERTMS deployments work over this mobile technology. However, due to
the different evolution pace of telecommunication and railway technologies,
and despite ERTMS is still considered a modern system, its communication
module has already shown its limitations.
Nowadays, the railway industry is working on the digitalisation and the
transition to IP technology of most of signalling systems. Aligned with this
trend, UNISIG has recently released a new communication model for ERTMS
which includes an IP-based operation mode additionally to the CS-based one.
In order to get an accurate view of the weak and strong points of the current
ERTMS, in this chapter we make a description in depth as well as a critical
analysis according to the current perspective and to the upcoming migration
towards IP technology.
We start this analysis by introducing the three main blocks of ERTMS: the
GSM-R, the Euroradio (CFM and SFM) and the ETCS application. After, we
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define the requirements and constrains associated to the railway domain. This
requirements will help to detect the shortcomings of ERTMS and will define a
minimum goal to be achieved by the new communication architecture proposed
in this thesis work. Afterwards, the ERTMS shortcomings are evaluated for its
mobile technology, for its communication module and for its safety module.
This chapter ends with a conclusion about the shortcomings that should be
overcome which justifies the motivation of the research work of this thesis.
2.2 architecture of train management sys-tems
ERTMS is an advanced ATP system composed of three main components, as
mentioned in the introduction; ETCS, Euroradio and GSM-R. The ETCS signalling
messages are delivered using a data circuit which is dedicated to each train
using circuit-switched technology. That way, only the two extremes of the
circuit, the RBC and the train, can have access to these messages. In order
to ensure the reliability and security of these communications, the Euroradio
protocol is provided.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the protocol stack of ERTMS. This architecture is divided
in three main functional blocks. In the top the ETCS application that exchange
messages between the RBC and the OBU in the train side. This application
communicates with the Euroradio SFM which has to protect the integrity and
the authentication of exchanges messages. Bellow this safety module, the
Euroradio CFM provides end-to-end reliable communications using underlying
mobile communication channel, in this case, an end-to-end circuit established
through GSM-R network.
In the following sections we will explain the current ERTMS architecture
following a bottom-up approach which will start from the Euroradio’s CFM
and will finish with the ETCS application.
2.2 architecture of train management systems 17
Figure 2.2.: Architecture of ERTMS communication model (Source: Unisig Subset-037
v3.2.0
2.2.1 ERTMS: Communication Functional Module of Euroradio
In this section the protocol stack of the CFM is explained. However there is
not only one protocol stack in ERTMS. From the point of view of ERTMS entities
involved in the communication, on the one hand, we have the protocol stack
used in the RBC-RBC relations, which is based on TCP/IP. On the other hand, we
have the protocols stacks used in the OBU-RBC relations, which are two different
protocol stacks, one based on CS technology and the other in PS technology.
OBU-RBC communication scheme was originally designed only to work over CS
technology, using OSI protocols. However, recently a new protocol stack based
on TCP/IP has been released, which will be the one used in future deployments
and therefore, the reference model taken for this research work.
In the next lines, we will explain in depth the two protocol stacks, which are
based on TCP/IP and used for RBC-RBC and OBU-RBC communications.
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Communication Functional Module for RBC-RBC Communications
Although the communication between two neighbour RBC, defined in the
subset-0.98, is out of scope of this research work, the considerations made
in this specification have been used as a basis to define the OBU-RBC
communications over TCP/IP. Therefore, it is worth describing the CFM used
for these communications.
The CFM for these communications provides the following functions over a
non-trusted transmission channel.
• Adaptation between Euroradio Safety Layer and the transport protocol,
TCP
• Redundancy to fulfil the availability requirements
• Reliable, transparent and bidirectional transfer of data
• Retransmission of segments, if necessary
• Monitoring of channel availability
The design of the CFM has been made under some assumptions in contrast
with the CFM used currently for train-to-ground communications. Within these
assumptions it is worth noting the lack of high priority data and explicit flow
control. Additionally, the user data is never longer than 1000 bytes.
In this specification, the Euroradio layer keeps the primitives based
on Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standards Sector (ITU-T)
X.224 for communicating with the transport layer. These primitives are not
compatible with TCP. Therefore, an ALE that translates these primitives is
needed. Additionally to this translation, an address mapping is also needed
in order to associate properly the ETCS ID of each RBC with each corresponding
IP address. Last but not least, the TCP protocol does not provide redundancy
capability. Moreover, a TCP connection can only work with a single interface
as its addressing is designed to work with a 4-tuple composed of IPsource,
IPdestination, Portsource and Portdestination. Thus, the ALE has to be also able to
manage this redundancy, creating multiple TCP connections and managing
them transparently for the application layer. These functions, as well as the
integration of the ALE in the protocol stack, are illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3.: Functions provided by the ALE
The ALE defines two classes of service: Class A and Class D. Both classes
of service differ from each other in the delivery policy performed by the
redundancy manager. In both redundancy schemes, two or more physical links
can be used, but for our description, the case of only two links is taken into
account.
In Class A, both links can be used to transfer data, but data packets are
transmitted in only one of them each time. In this class, different connections
are labelled as "normal" or "redundant". In normal conditions, data is delivered
though the "normal" link, whereas the "redundant" one is only used when the
"normal" one fails.
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In Class D, both links are used at the same time for data delivery. Thus, the
same transport sequence number is transmitted on both TCP connections. At
the receiver side, the ALE layer should detect the same packet reception in both
TCP connections and consequently discard the one that arrives later.
Communication Functional Module for OBU-RBC Communications
This section defines the communication protocol stack used in ERTMS over
PS technology, which is described in the Subset-037 v3.2.0, but at the time
of writing these lines, was not implemented in any railway corridor. It is
worth noting that ERTMS was originally designed to work over CS technology.
This means that the primitives used by ETCS to interact with the CFM were
also designed in that context. Therefore, an abstraction layer to adapt these
primitives to the primitives used in TCP/IP is needed.
This primitive translation is made within the ALE. This entity is based on the
one presented in the Subset-098 for RBC-RBC. The main functions of the ALE are:
• The adaptation the Euroradio Safety Layer and the TCP layer.
• The establishment and Release of the TCP connection.
• Encapsulation and decapsulation of packets between Safety Layer and
TCP stream.
• Monitoring of channel availability.
Comparing to the ALE used between RBC communications, described
in Section 2.2.1, the one proposed for OBU-RBC communications lacks in
redundancy support. The Subset-037 assumes that the RBC will have multiple
network interfaces, that is, the RBC will be multihoming node. However, the OBU
will have a single network interface, so the subset assumes that the redundancy
cannot be performed as a unique RBC’s IP address will be able to be used at the
same time by the TCP session. Hence, for these train-to-ground communications,
the Class D described in Section 2.2.1 will be used but without redundancy, that
is, a regular TCP connection.
Another difference between the PS mode compared to the CS mode is that the
first one is not able to handle HP messages, such as the one for commanding
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emergency brake to the train. This limitation comes from the fact that these
messages in the CS mode are by-passed from the application to the link layer
without using any of protocols from safety layer to network layer. However, in
PS this bypass cannot be made as the end-to-end connection is not performed as
an end-to-end circuit at the link layer. On the contrary, in PS mode the end-to-end
connection is established using two-level addresses, source and destination IP addresses
at the network layer, and source and destination TCP ports at transport layer.
As commented previously, in the PS mode TCP is used as transport layer
protocol. For the parametrisation of the TCP, the Linux implementation is chosen as a
reference. Over this model, a set of parameters have been proposed in the Subset-
037 v3.2.0, which is summarised in the Table 9.21. The proposed value for each
parameter is based on the Request For Comments (RFC)s related to TCP.
It is worth noting that for the Round-Trip delay Time (RTT) and retransmission
timeout (RTO) calculation the Jacobson and Karn algorithms are proposed following the
RFC 1122.
For the network layer, this subset establishes that both, the OBU and the RBC
must support Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), and below this layer, GPRS access
technology will be the responsible to provide the wireless connection and set
up a dedicated Packet Data Protocol (PDP) context for ETCS.
2.2.2 ERTMS: Safe Functional Module of Euroradio
For ensuring the security of signalling communications, ERTMS adopts the
CENELEC standard EN 50159 as a reference for the design of its safety protocol.
This standard defines seven security risks that must be faced:
• Repetition: an existing message is resent out of its corresponding moment.
• Deletion: a message is deleted from the network so that the receiver cannot
receive it.
• Insertion: a message is inserted into the communication channel by an
attacker.
• Re-sequencing: the sequence number of a message is intentionally
modified.
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No. Mandatory Feature RFC Recommended
Value
1 Initial RTO 793 & 1122 Minimum RTO
2 Minimum RTO 793 & 1122 4 s
3 Maximum RTO 793 & 1122 10 s
4 Karn and Jacobson’s algorithm, with
exponential back-off
1122 Standard values
5 TcpMaxConnectRetransmissions 793 & 1122 3
6 TcpMaxDataRetransmissions 793 & 1122 3
7 TcpKeepAliveTime 793 & 1122 12 s
8 TcpKeepAliveInterval 793 & 1122 3 s
9 TcpKeepAliveProbes 793 & 1122 3
10 TcpSack 2018 & 2883 Enabled
11 TcpNoDelay 896 Enabled
12 TCP Push Bit 793 Enabled
13 Max TCP segment size 793 1416 bytes
Table 2.1.: Summary of parametrisation proposed by UNISIG for TCP-based ERTMS:
Baseline parametrisation
• Corruption: a message is modified resulting in another valid message.
• Delay: a message is intentionally delayed by overloading the transmission
network.
• Masquerade: an attacker performs an identity theft managing to pass as a
valid entity of the communication.
The ERTMS faces security risks such as replay attacks and identity theft attacks
at different levels [13]. Such risks are counteracted in two main ways. On the
one hand, the introduction of timestamps in the ERTMS messages prevents the
replay attacks. On the other hand, the authentication and integrity of messages
relies on cryptographic algorithms implemented by the Euroradio safety layer.
2.2 architecture of train management systems 23
This layer implements a Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
(CBC-MAC) for avoiding message insertion, data corruption and masquerading.
Other risks detected in the norm EN 50159 are also faced by the ETCS application
by introducing timestamps in each message, which are also used for sequencing
messages, and end side identifications. Thus, the SFM provides protection
against message repetition, deletion, resequencing and delay.
The robustness of the safety layer depends directly to the robustness of
the CBC-MAC used and in the key distribution used in this cryptographic
mechanism.
Description of Safe session establishment
All communications between the OBU of the train and the RBC are done through
a safe session which is established from the beginning of the connection. For
each session, a new secret key is generated between two entities involved in
the communication, i.e. between the OBU and the RBC. This key, also known
as KSMAC or KS, has 192 bit length and is derived from a key material
shared between both entities, KMAC key. The safety session establishment is
illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4.: Session establishment of Euroradio Safety protocol
As can be seen, B entity initialises the connection by sending the text1 and a
random number of 64 bits, RB. Equally, when A entity response to this message,
it responses with the text2, another random number of 64 bits, RA, and the
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CBC-MAC for the concatenation of text3, RA, RB, Destination Address (DA) and
a padding, p, with the session key generated from the known KMAC and the
both random numbers, KS. At this stage, B entity has the RA, the RB, the text3,
the DA (its own address) and the KS, so it can compute de CBC-MAC and
generate the session key, KS, and check that the other side of the communication
has received correctly the RA and that both are using the same KS.
In order to establish the connection, a third message is sent from B to A, with
the CBC-MAC for the concatenation of text5, RB, RA and a padding, p. Thus, the
A entity, as it knows all data to perform the CBC-MAC, can also verify that the
B entity has correctly received the RA and verify that both have generated and
are using the same KS.
All data present in the text1, text2, text3, text4 and text5 is known for both
entities as it is information related with the entities’ addresses and the ETCS
identification and the message type identifier.
text1 = ”ETY | MTI | DF | SA | SaF”, where SA = calling ETCS ID
text2 = ”ETY|MTI|DF|SA|SaF”, where SA = responding ETCS ID
text3 = ”l|DA|ETY|MTI|DF|SA|SaF”, where DA = calling ETCS ID and SA
= responding ETCS ID
text4 = ”‘000′|MTI|DF”
text5 = ”l|DA|‘000′|MTI|DF”, where DA = responding ETCS ID
As it has been explained previously, the KS is generated from the KMAC key
and from both random numbers of 64 bits. These two random numbers are
split in two blocks of 32 bits for performing the key derivation procedure:
RA = RLA|RRA
RB = RLB|RRB
Equally, the KMAC key is divided in three blocks of 64 bits:
KMAC = KAB = K1 | K2 | K3
The following operations are done in both entities, A and B, for generating
the session key, KS, which is the concatenation of KS1, KS2 and KS3.
KS1 := MAC(RLA|RLB, KAB) = DES(K3, DES−1(K2, DES(K1, RLA|RLB)))
KS2 := MAC(RRA|RRB , KAB) = DES(K3, DES−1(K2, DES(K1, RRA|RRB)))
KS3 := MAC(RLA|RLB, K′AB) = DES(K1, DES−1(K2, DES(K3, RLA|RLB)))
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With this scheme, both parts, the OBU and the RBC, must know in advance
a shared key material, KMAC. In the following lines, we explain how this key
material is distributed through all elements involved in a safety connection.
Description of key exchange procedure
The key material used in Euroradio is exchanged through a Key Management
System (KMS) protected by different key materials. The ERTMS uses four different
keys, which can be categorised in three levels. Table 2.2 summarises this key
material, including the entities that make use of each key and their functions.
Key name Key size Functions Entities involved
Level 3:
K-KMC 384 bits Encryption, Authentication & Integrity KMC-KMC
KTRANS 384 bits Encryption, Authentication & Integrity
KMC-RBC
KMC-OBU
Level 2:
KMAC 192 bits Authentication &amp; Integrity OBU-RBC
Level 1:
KSMAC 192 bits Authentication &amp; Integrity OBU-RBC
Table 2.2.: Summary of key material used in ERTMS
The key material in ERTMS is generated by the Key Management Center
(KMC), with the exception of KSMACs, which are negotiated for each session
between ERTMS entities. Each ERTMS entity must have a valid KMAC shared
with other ERTMS entities for establishing safe communication. In order to
ensure the secure distribution of KMAC keys from the KMC to ERTMS entities
and to other KMCs, transport keys (K-KMC and KTRANS) are used to provide
confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Half of the transport key is used for
confidentiality by performing Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) ciphering
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and the other is used for authentication and integrity by calculating a CBC-MAC
code.
Figure 2.5.: Offline Key distribution system in ERTMS: 1) KTRANS and KKMC keys
distribution; 2) KMAC keys distribution; 3) KSMAC derivation from KMAC;
4) safe communication using KSMAC.
The key distribution methodology, illustrated in Figure 2.5, is based on
messages defined in Subset-114 of ERTMS specification. These messages can be
exchanged using an offline or a new online mode defined in the Subset-137.
However, until now, only the offline mode has been carried out, using physical
storage devices such as USB sticks or CDROMs. That is, the keys are distributed
through manual file distribution process.
In order to guarantee the confidentiality, the authentication and the integrity
during the key distribution, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is
chosen in the Subset-137. This protocol is based on ITU-T Recommendation
X.509, which means that the proposal fulfils the requirements defined by
the European standard EN 50159-2 for safety-related communication in open
transmission networks in the railway domain. The authentication can be
achieved by two methods, by using a Pre-Shared Key (PSK), named TLS-PSK
or by using certificates from a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), named TLS-PKI.
However in the TLS-PSK method, the problem about how to distribute this pre-
shared key material remains. Moreover, it would only valid for KMC and KMAC
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entities under the same domain. Therefore, the TLS-PKI is preferred, setting aside
the TLS-PSK method as fall-back method.
Figure 2.6.: Online Key distribution system in ERTMS: 1) KTRANS and K-KMC are
replaced by a private/public key pair; 2) KMAC keys distribution using
TLS with the private/public key scheme; 3) the identity of the parties is
checked using a public key infrastructure scheme; 4) KSMAC derivation
from KMAC; 5) safe communication using KSMAC.
To avoid impact of key distribution procedure on ETCS service, this function
is proposed to be carried over a separate GPRS Access Point Name (APN). In fact,
the key distribution process and the ETCS are treated independently, performing
first the key distribution and then using it in the ETCS service as it is illustrated
in Figure 2.6.
2.2.3 ERTMS: ETCS application
Currently the most modern train control systems for high speed services are
based on the continuously supervision of the train movement. This is made
by frequently comparing the train’s current speed against the speed profile
assigned to that service in the current position. Therefore, it is necessary for
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the train to have the information necessary for this comparison available at any
time. Within this information, the following data can be highlighted:
• The current train location in relation with a reference point.
• The current maximum speed at this position.
• The current train position.
In ERTMS the signalling application that allows obtaining this information
is ETCS. This application has different operational levels. Depending on the
level, different technology is used. In this research work we put the focus
on the messages exchanged in the ETCS Levels 2 and 3, which are the ones
being deployed in new High Speed Train services and the ones where message
exchange relies on wireless access technology.
Three are the main messages used in ETCS to exchange these data: the
Movement Authority message, the Position Report message and the Movement
Authority Request message.
movement authority This message is sent using the message number 3
defined in the Subset-026-8. Within these messages the route set for the train,
the mode profiles, speed limitations and the information needed to achieve the
required safety level is exchanged.
train position report This message is sent using the message number 136
defined in the Subset-026-8. Within this message the OBU reports its position
under different conditions which are: periodically in space or time, when
passing over a group of Eurobalises configured for this duty, when mode-
change execution happens, at level-change execution and as a consequence of
an explicit request from the RBC.
movement authority request This message is sent using the message
number 132 defined in the Subset-026-8. This message is used by the OBU
to explicitly request a Movement Authority to the RBC via the wireless
communication channel.
A typical sequence diagram for ETCS Level 2 or 3 is illustrated in Figure
2.7. The Movement Authority and Position Report messages are frequently
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exchanged. On the contrary, the Movement Authority Request message is sent
by the OBU when it identifies that the train is approaching to the point where
the braking curve begins.
Figure 2.7.: Sequence diagram for ETCS Level 2 or 3
As mentioned before, the information carried by these messages is valid
for the current moment. Therefore, these messages have a lifetime during
which their information is valid. To guarantee this requirement, during the
establishment of the ETCS connection, the OBU sends to the RBC the on-board
clock and the RBC sends back an acknowledgement of it. After this moment,
both sides are synchronised and ceach message is marked with a timestamp
that determines its lifetime.
2.3 communication requirements and con-strains in the railway domain
Communication networks used to carry train signalling have some specific
characteristics [14] inherent to the railway context that can be distinguished
as follow:
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• Hard delay constrains: Train signalling systems do not require high data
rates, nevertheless most signalling messages, such as the movement
authority messages, present a short life-time (message vitality). Longer
delays than expected turn the message useless and even dangerous, as
it may force the train to stop and consequently affect availability and
operational indicators. This delay may not be longer than 500 ms to fulfil
European Integrated Radio Enhanced Network (EIRENE) requirements
over GSM-R. At the moment, the ETCS Quality of Service (QoS) profile of
FFFIS for Euroradio version 13.0.0 (Table 2.2, note 4) [15] does not define
a maximum transfer delay. However, according to Table 2.3 published by
the Danish Railway Company, Banedanmark [1], it is expected to be the
same for GPRS .
• Frequent handovers: The base stations of the mobile access network are
placed along the railway to provide coverage to trains in movement.
Trains moving at high speed pass through different coverage areas and
consequently perform a sequence of handover processes.
• Multiple communication networks: During the last years multiple networks
have been deployed along railways [16]. Some of them such as Terrestrial
Trunked Radio (TETRA) and GSM-R are rail specific and owned by railway
operators. Additionally the deployment of GSM-R has been done in many
cases redundantly, providing multiple overlapped cell coverage [17].
• High security requirements: These signalling communications have high
security requirements because a malicious identity theft could be used
to perform an attack that could risk passenger’s life.
• High reliability requirements: Both ends of the communication link must
ensure the correct delivery of signalling messages. Thus, the reliability
in implemented protocols must be guaranteed. In GSM-R, network
and transport protocols, T.70 and X.224 respectively, are connection
oriented and introduce reliability mechanisms. Within X.224, two ways
to promote reliability are defined: message reception acknowledgement
and retransmission; and splitting and recombining function which allows
the simultaneous use of two or more network connections to support the
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same transport connection, that is, a multipath strategy. However, this
last reliability mechanism is not used in the X.224 deployment of GSM-R,
because the system is considered reliable enough with retransmission
mechanisms at different protocols. Additionally, this functionality would
need multiple channel reservation and this fact would mean a reduction
in capacity and availability of the GSM-R network due to the limited
spectrum of this technology [17].
QoS Parameter Value
Data integrity (Reliability Class 2): Based on GSM 02 60
• Probability of data loss <10−4
• Probability of data suplication <10−5
• Probability of out-of-sequence data <10−5
• Probability of data corruption <10−6
Data Transfer Delay (Delay Class 1): Based on GSM 02 60
• Mean delay for 128 byte packet <0.5 s
• 95% of 128 byte packets delayed <1.5 s
• Mean delay for 1024 byte packet <2 s
• 95% of 1024 byte packet delayed <7 s
Table 2.3.: Proposed KPIs for ETCS over GPRS [1]
2.4 analysis of the current ertms
The current communication protocol stack of ERTMS has some limitations and
shortcomings that should be overcome in future ERTMS specifications. The
upcoming migration towards IP is a good chance to address these limitations
by introducing new proposals.
In this section, we differentiate these shortcomings in three main groups: 1)
the shortcomings of GSM-R, 2) the design limitations of the current Euroradio
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CFM and the limited compatibility with new communication technologies, and
3) the security shortcomings of ERTMS.
2.4.1 Shortcomings of GSM-R/GPRS
There are three main shortcomings of GSM-R; its limited channel capacity,
interferences produces by public telcos’ networks and the lack of industry
support after 2030.
As explained in [18], as GSM-R deploys CS based data transmission, each
data connection requires a dedicated channel. Due to the used Frequency
Division Duplex (FDD) and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) mechanisms
the effective capacity of each cell is no higher than 23 simultaneous connections,
including voice and data services. As in ETCS each train must have a permanent
connection with the RBC, and taking into account that some channels are
reserved for voice communications and handover procedures [1], the maximum
train number in a junction under the coverage of a single cell is less than 20
[18]. This limitation suppose a bottleneck for railway operations that can hardly
overcome without a migration towards another access technology with better
spectrum efficiency in order to optimise the currently reserved frequency band
for GSM-R (876− 880 MHz for the Uplink and 921− 925 MHz for the Downlink).
The dedicated frequencies of GSM-R suffer from interferences produced by
public operators providing services in the 900 MHz band. The intention of
public telcos and railway infrastructure managers is to provide as higher and
better radio coverage as possible along the track. On the one hand, telcos want
to provide voice and data services for travelling passengers. On the other hand,
railway managers need correct GSM-R coverage to operate trains services safely.
This problem has increased with the popularisation of broadband services over
LTE technology [19]. These interference problems have been identified by the
ERA and this agency is already working on coexistence strategies [20].
In the telecommunication market, the shortcomings of GSM were noticed long
time ago as soon as the data communication needs increased and overtook
the voice ones. At that age, GSM was replaced by GPRS first, Universal Mobile
Telephone Service (UMTS) after and nowadays by LTE. The railway industry
is not unaware of this evolution because the decrease of manufacturers in
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the telecommunication market supposes also a lack of competence between
them, therefore an increase of production and maintenance costs. Although
GSM-R suppliers have guaranteed support to this technology until 2030 [21], the
railway industry is already working on the migration towards a new access
technology, starting for the definition of ERTMS over GPRS. In fact, the ERA
expects to have started the deployment of the replace technology for 2022 [21].
During the last years, predicting the necessity of switching to other access
network technologies, multiple academic proposals have been made for
substituting GSM-R. From the industrial side, other access technologies have also
been tested in railways. The report demanded by the ERA [12] in order to find
the most suitable candidate to substitute GSM-R, summarises the possibilities
available in the market, as well as previous experiences all around the world.
The most suitable technology to succeed GSM-R as a first step of this migration
is GPRS. The suitability for the railway domain has already been demonstrated
[11, 12]. The advantage of this technology comparing to other alternatives is
that it can use the same frequency bands already reserved for GSM-R and as
it introduces better resource managing for data communications it introduces
more efficient spectrum use.
However, this migration towards GPRS is not assumed by every country.
In Kazakhstan for example [12], TETRA was introduced as communication
technology for ERTMS. In the next years the adoption of TETRA is also expected
in Finland as underlying technology for ERTMS [22].
In Australia the coexistence of different access networks as carrier for railway
signalling has become a reality. This strategy overcomes the lack of coverage in
some areas by using commercial cellular UMTS networks [12].
Additionally, many academic works have demonstrate the suitability of 4G
technologies, Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) [23]
and LTE [24, 25], for the railway domain. These works, in addition to the quick
technology evolution, have encouraged industry to think in 4G or even in 5G
technologies as a long term technology for the NGERTMS.
All in all, these technologies candidate to replace GSM-R for data
transmissions are based on IP technology. Therefore, when talking about
NGERTMS, the adaptation of the protocol stack to a full IP-based one is envisaged.
Moreover, the adoption of different technologies in different countries or
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corridors is more than probable. Thus, the new ERTMS protocol stack should address
the coexistence between different access technologies, as well as the handover between
them in a transparent way.
2.4.2 Design limitations of Euroradio communication module
When Euroradio CFM was designed, the OSI protocol stack was adopted as
reference model. Due to this design option, the primitives to connect the
CFM and the SFM are designed for the OSI transport layer, ITU-T X.224. The
strategy made in CS mode based on implementing specific protocols for railway
domain has turned out to be costly and complex [26]. Therefore, the trend for
next generation signalling systems is expected to be the adoption of market standard
protocols [21].
The inclusion of de-facto protocols, i.e. TCP/IP protocol stack needs for an
adaptation layer which translates the primitives from X.224 format to TCP/IP
format. The addition of adaptation layer involves more processing latency and
data overhead due to the addition of headers carrying out the same function.
Moreover, although in the new Subset-037 v3.2.0 the adoption of TCP/IP has
been made, this subset does not allow the use of other wireless technology
than GSM-R or GPRS because the channel requirements established for both, CS
mode and PS mode, are based on circuits established by GSM-R of PDP contexts
provided by GPRS.
Another design shortcoming in the CS mode comes from the fact that
both, data link and transport layers, have similar functions assigned for the
same communication context. This is the case of retransmission mechanisms.
Although usually data link layer protocols have retransmission mechanisms
for providing reliability to the physical channel, this is usually oriented to
the device-to-device link protection, whereas the transport retransmission
mechanism protect the whole connection from the source to destination.
However, in the case of ERTMS, the connection is set up over a virtual circuit
from the train to the RBC and therefore the underlying channel protected by
the data link layer is also protected by the transport layer. This duplication of
functions implies the addition of supplementary timeouts which involves an
increase of data transfer latency.
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In the PS mode, the existence of multiple network interfaces in the RBC is
expected. However, the management of this multihoming support of the RBC is not
detailed in the transition towards IP proposed in the Subset-037 v3.2.0. Moreover,
in this subset, a parametrisation for TCP protocol is proposed. However, these
parameters have been taken mainly from RFCs present in the literature that
are oriented to the fixed networks. The problem with these parameters is that
they are based on the assumption that there are always more data to transmit
that the channel can afford, therefore any packet loss is produced by network
congestion. That is why congestion control algorithms are proposed for TCP
protocol. This assumption can be seen also in the Karn algorithm applied
when consecutive retransmission are triggered. For this circumstance, this
algorithm, proposes an exponential increment of the timeout time required to
wait until the next retransmission. Another case where the adoption of standard
parametrisation is not suitable is the values adopted for the Jacobson algorithm
which calculates the current Smoothed Round-Trip Time (SRTT) and RTO. These
values were calculated originally from extensive tests made in fixed networks
where the channel conditions do not change abruptly. However, this is not the
case of railway wireless networks where the movement of the mobile node and
electromagnetic disturbances produce changes in channel conditions.
2.4.3 Analysis of the Euroradio safety module
This section considers the cyber security threats to current ERTMS security
mechanisms based on the taxonomy of cyber attacks on the IT domain
presented in the appendix A. This cyber security analysis was already
published in the IEEE Communications Magazine in 2015 [13]. It is structured
in two parts: the first part reports on those attacks initially considered in the
ERTMS design phase, while the second part is concerned with the security
threats that were not considered during the ERTMS design phase.
Analysis of ERTMS security mechanisms
The ERTMS faces security risks such as replay attacks and identity theft attacks
at different levels. Such risks are counteracted in two main approaches. On the
one hand, the introduction of timestamps in the ERTMS messages prevents the
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replay attacks. On the other hand, the authentication and integrity of messages
relies on cryptographic algorithms implemented by the Euroradio safety layer.
Below, we analyse these mechanisms and algorithms in order to identify their
strengths and weaknesses.
As mentioned above, to counteract replay attacks, the ERTMS introduces
timestamps to sequence the messages. However, this mechanism is not
introduced during the session establishment process, making it vulnerable to
such attacks. Additionally, since the sequence numbering using timestamps is
made at the application layer level, the end-side must decrypt the Message
Authentication Code (MAC) provided by Euroradio before checking the validity
of the sequence number. This fact can be exploited to perform a flooding attack,
resending several valid – but out-of-sequence – messages, which degrades
system performance. Preventing such attacks depends on the confidentiality
provided by the GSM-R encryption algorithm. However, this algorithm has been
already cracked. Moreover, pre-computed key tables – named rainbow tables –
are available on the Internet, which allow an attacker to listen and even spoof
entities in the same cell of the network. Thus, we can affirm that ERTMS is
vulnerable to eavesdropping and replay flooding attacks due to GSM-R weakness
and the current ERTMS protocol structure.
From the message integrity and authentication point of view, the potential
vulnerability of ERTMS comes from two main factors: the vulnerability of the
key material distribution and the weakness of the cryptographic algorithms
used.
The key exchange methodology explained in Section 2.2.2 deals with the
security of the process. However, the offline process widely used until now,
requires personnel to manually deliver the messages from the KMC to the ERTMS
entities. Because this process is complex, there is a risk of simplifying it by using
the same KMAC for large train fleets. As pointed out in a tender document
[27] released by the Danish Railway Company, this fact has security and safety
implications, because when many parties share a secret it is no longer a secret.
Furthermore, the physical delivery of the key material introduces the possibility
of attacks based on social engineering.
With the new online Key Distribution System, the complexity and the cost
of distributing all keys for a fleet manually has been reduced. Therefore, the
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security risk associated to the use of the same key for all the fleet has also
decreased. Moreover, the adoption of TLS with a PKI provides higher protection
in the key material distribution comparing with the process defined for the
offline mode.
From the point of view of the cryptographic algorithm, critical vulnerabilities of Data
Encryption Standard (DES), when it is used to compute CBC-MAC codes, have been
already pointed out [28]. As Smith et al have demonstrated, DES is vulnerable to
key-collision attacks based on the birthday paradox, which are more efficient
than brute force attacks. Additionally, the use of 3DES does not introduce a
much higher level of robustness comparing to DES, since it is still vulnerable
to meet-in-the-middle attacks [28]. Actually, the real robustness of 3DES is
not higher than O(284) if 228 cipher texts are available for the attack. This
vulnerability is risky in terms of the authentication provided by the KSMAC.
However, higher risk comes from two factors: 1) the fact that multiple trains
make use of the same KMAC for a long time, and 2) the possibility of using
weak random number generators during the KSMAC derivation. In fact, if
the attack is performed against the session establishment with the goal of
finding the KMAC, the whole system could be compromised: an attacker
could take the identity of one or many trains during subsequent session
establishments. As the KSMAC derivation from the KMAC is a public process
and the random numbers travel in plain text, the effectiveness of the attack
increases considerably.
Once the new online Key Distribution System incorporates TLS-PKI, and knowing
that the session key negotiation could be improved from the point of view of security,
the question is: why TLS-PKI is not applied also for the safety communication between
ERTMS entities instead of using it only for KMAC distribution? Moreover, if ERTMS
would communicate each other using TLS-PKI and they have their own certificates,
would KMAC keys be necessary?
Security threats not considered by ERTMS
The risks of suffering communications attacks have traditionally been
counteracted by isolating the railway networks. Using isolated circuit-switched
networks not connected to the open internet and reserved frequency bands;
the communication between ERTMS elements has been inaccessible to outsiders.
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However, the feasibility of these attacks now requires reconsideration on
account of two factors: the popularisation of commercial jammers working
in the same band used by GSM-R, and the impending migration of ERTMS
towards IP-based cellular technologies [12]. This security risk is common to
other vehicular communication technologies, such as Dedicated Short Range
Communications (DSRC) [29].
Table 2.4 summarises the potential cyber attacks against ERTMS, their
feasibility and mitigation techniques of ERTMS [13] for overcoming them. It also
ranks security risks using estimated values for likelihood of occurrence and
impact of each attack upon the network. This risk analysis has been done using
the Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization Over Networks
(TIPHON) methodology published by the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI).
When compared to the analysis presented in [30] for DSRC, we can conclude
that the threat scenario is similar and spoofing threats are also the most critical
ones. Unlike [30] we differentiate the feasibility of jamming and flooding
attacks and therefore the risk for the first one is critical whereas the risk for
the second one is major.
2.4 analysis of the current ertms 39
Ta
rg
et
A
tt
ac
k
ty
pe
M
ea
ns
K
no
w
le
dg
e
ne
ed
ed
D
et
ec
ti
on
ca
pa
bi
li
ty
M
it
ig
at
io
n
te
ch
ni
qu
e
sp
ec
ifi
ed
in
ER
T
M
S
O
cu
rr
en
ce
li
ke
li
-
ho
od
Im
pa
ct
R
is
k
le
ve
l
O
BU
-
R
BC
co
m
m
s.
Pa
ss
iv
e
Ea
ve
s-
dr
op
pi
ng
M
ed
iu
m
Lo
w
D
ep
en
de
nt
on
G
SM
-R
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
Po
ss
ib
le
Lo
w
M
in
or
A
ct
iv
e
Ja
m
m
in
g
Lo
w
H
ig
h
N
ot
co
ns
id
er
ed
Li
ke
ly
M
ed
iu
m
:
fo
rc
e
de
gr
ad
ed
m
od
e
C
ri
ti
ca
l
Sp
oo
fin
g
H
ig
h
M
ed
iu
m
A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n
an
d
in
te
gr
it
y
Po
ss
ib
le
H
ig
h:
w
ro
ng
dr
iv
in
g
C
ri
ti
ca
l
Fl
oo
di
ng
re
pl
ay
at
ta
ck
s
H
ig
h
H
ig
h
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
of
A
TP
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
Po
ss
ib
le
M
ed
iu
m
:
fo
rc
e
de
gr
ad
ed
m
od
e
M
aj
or
Table
2.4.:
R
ev
ie
w
of
po
te
nt
ia
la
tt
ac
ks
in
ER
TM
S
40 revision of ertms and thesis motivation
2.5 summary and motivation
ERTMS protocol stack will need to be updated as soon as a newer radio access
technology is adopted as a substitute of GSM-R. Currently ERA is looking for
candidate technologies for this replacement, being all of them designed to work
with IP. This new communication solution should be ready by 2018 for starting
the transition in 2022. Meanwhile, UNISIG has released a new version of the
Subset-037 which specifies the adoption of the TCP/IP protocol stack. However,
in the current ERTMS specification, in both, CS mode or PS mode, multiple
shortcomings that should be overcome have been detected.
On the one hand, in the CFM specification the following shortcomings have
been detected:
1. According to the current ERTMS standard regular ETCS traffic and High
Priority traffic should be treated differently. However, the bypass strategy
followed in the CS mode of ERTMS is not valid for the PS mode, because
the connection is not based on a virtual circuit that links the source and
the destination.
2. Within the new definition of a protocol stack for NGERTMS, the coexistence
of heterogeneous radio coverage in the railway corridors should be taken
into account, as well as the future evolution. Moreover, the protocol
stack should be independent to the underlying technology, because the
different pace of evolution between the railway and telecommunication
market will force to address new radio technology migration within the
life cycle of the train.
3. The multihoming support of RBCs in the PS, as potential contributor of
reliability, is not exploited in any way.
4. The configuration parameters for the TCP protocols chosen were made
for fixed networks where channel conditions do not change abruptly.
Additionally, these parameters are also select for scenarios where packet
losses are provoked by network congestion. This assumption does not fit
with the characteristics of the ETCS application: low packet size and long
interval time between the deliveries of two consecutive packets.
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5. Market standard protocols should be adopted, if possible, and railway
specific protocol avoided. The experience with railway specific technology
has demonstrated that its reduced market increases its development and
maintenance costs, as well as difficult its compatibility with ubiquitous
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology.
On the other hand, in the SFM specification the following shortcomings have
been detected:
6. The cryptographic algorithms used for safety session between two
ERTMS entities, CBC-MAC and 3DES, have been found not robust enough
comparing to the current state of the art.
7. The cryptographic algorithms used for safety sessions are fixed and
cannot be upgraded without changing all the specification of the
Euroradio Safety Layer. These algorithms should be updated according
to the security state of the art.
8. The new protocol stack should address the new security risks pointed
out in Table 2.4 of Section 2.4.3, specially the protection against jamming
attacks.
2.6 goals and contributions
Based on the analysis of the current ERTMS system described in this chapter,
we envisage that there is a need to re-design ERTMS protocol stack to address
the shortcomings explained in the lines above. The main goal of this thesis
is to propose a new protocol stack for ERTMS which addresses the detected
shortcomings in train-to-ground communications and make the NGERTMS more
resilient compared to the current system. The specific goals to be addressed by
this research work are enumerated below:
1. Improve the survivability against end-to-end channel disruptions and
reduce the latency in ERTMS communications. The faster and more reliable
the communication is, the more efficient the train operation will be.
42 revision of ertms and thesis motivation
2. A proposal to overcome the current limitation of ERTMS in its PS mode to
operate with HP messages by providing them higher resiliency and lower
delay comparing to the regular messages.
3. Offer a solution based on standard solutions which will reduce the
CAPEX and OPEX by facilitating the adoption of COTS equipment widely
used in the telecommunication market.
4. Facilitate the backward compatibility of the proposal with the current
system. The migration towards a new proposed protocol stack will be
gradual. Therefore, the proposed system should be able to work with the
current protocol stack present in the PS mode.
5. Respond to the need of railway operators to provide telecommunication
services through different access networks. This thesis aims to provide a
communication protocol stack for ERTMS that will allow the coexistence of
heterogeneous access technologies. This feature will ease the progressive
introduction of new access technologies in the future.
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. A complete analysis of current ERTMS from the communication and
security point of view and identification of a set of shortcomings to be
addressed to improve the train-to-ground signalling resilience.
2. Analysis of current redundant protocols as a cornerstone to achieve a
more resilient communication system over IP. For the evaluation of the
characteristics of each approach, a set of requirements composing a vector
named Resilience Requirements for ERTMS (RRE) has been defined. Over
this vector a semi-quantitative analysis is made which helps to select the
most suitable approach.
3. A proposal of a new protocol stack for ERTMS is introduced which has as
a basis the selected approach from the previous analysis. This protocol
stack is designed not only for a scenario with completely multihomed
equipment, but also for a transitional scenario where multihomed
equipment with the support of the proposed protocol stack coexists and
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interconnects with legacy ERTMS equipment in PS mode defined in the
Subset-037.
4. Parametrisation of TCP and MPTCP protocols and their scheduler in
accordance to the traffic to be carried (regular and HP). In total four
different parametrisations are presented which correspond to the class
services associated to the regular and HP traffic for full multihomed
scenario and a transitional scenario.
5. Development of two evaluation systems to analyse the suitability of
the proposal, one through a pure DES tests using the OPNET Modeler
simulation tool, and another through a hybrid simulated scenario with
real traffic.
In conclusion, the proposed protocol stack for the NGERTMS addresses the
shortcomings detected in this chapter. The performance of this resilient protocol
stack is evaluated under different harsh channel conditions with high packet
loss and connection disruptions demonstrating the improved of the proposal
comparing the legacy ERTMS communication protocol stack.

Part II
STATE OF THE ART
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laburpena
Atal honetan komunikazioen erresilientzia dugu aztergai, beti ere erresilientzia
hori kanal baten perturbazioaren aurrean zerbitzua automatikoki errekuperatzearen
ahalmena bezala ulertuta. Horretarako, lehenengo eta behin erresilientzia lortzeko
estrategia klasikoak aurkezten ditugu eta hauek burdinbideen testuingurura moldatzen
ditugu. Gero, burdinbideen industriak gaur egun komunikazio erresilienteak lortzeko
erabiltzen dituzten protokoloak aztertzen ditugu. Azterketa honetatik bi ondorio atera
daitezke; batetik erredundantzia dela erresilientziaren giltzarri nagusia eta bestetik
burdinbide industriak COTS ekipamendua erabili ahal izateko protokolo estandarrak
erabiltzea behar beharrezkoa dela. Horrexegatik, protokolo erredundanteen artearen
egoeraren azterketa sakona egiten da, OSI erreferentzia protokolo pilaren geruza
ezberdinetan banatuz. Azkenik, azterketa horretatik, metodo sasi-kuantitatibo bat
erabiliz, NGERTMSrentzako protokolorik aproposena MPTCP dela ondorioztatzen da,
nahiz eta bere inklusioak tesi honetan egingo diren doiketa batzuk behar dituen.
resumen
En este apartado analizamos la resiliencia de las comunicaciones, entendidas como
la habilidad para recuperarse automáticamente de disrupciones en el canal. Para
ello, primero introducimos las estrategias clásicas para alcanzar la resiliencia y los
adaptamos a las necesidades específicas del entorno ferroviario. Después hacemos un
resumen de las estrategias y protocolos usados para alcanzar la resiliencia en otros
sistemas del sector ferroviario. De este análisis se desprende que la redundancia es la
piedra angular de la resiliencia y que la única forma de adoptar equipamiento COTS
es el uso de protocolos estándar. Por ello, se realiza un profundo análisis del estado del
arte de los protocolos de comunicaciones redundantes, dividido en las diferentes capas
de la pila de referencia OSI. Por último, partiendo de ese análisis se evalúa mediante un
método semi-cuantitativo el protocolo idóneo para su adopción por el NGERTM, que es
MPTCP, a pesar de que su inclusión implica una serie de adaptaciones específicas que
pretenden solventarse en esta tesis.

3 ANALYS IS OF NETWORKRES I L I ENT PROTOCOLS
Science is organised
knowledge. Wisdom is
organised life.
Immanuel Kant
3.1 introduction
Railway signalling systems demand high reliability level as their performance
affects directly to the passenger’s life. In the previous chapter we have made a
revision in depth of the European system ERTMS.
As we have seen, in this system there are two main types of messages: the
regular and high priority messages. The normal operations of ERTMS make
use of the first type of messages, whereas emergency commands, such as
emergency break command, are delivered using high priority messages. Thus,
the migration of ERTMS towards TCP/IP should take into account this message
duality and propose mechanisms that could allow the application to deliver
different messages with different associated policy.
From the point of view of heterogeneous wireless network coexistence, the
NGERTMS should be able to exploit, if needed, this heterogeneity when multiple
access networks are available.
On the one hand, this coexistence could help to become communications
more robust against network disruptions. These disruptions could be
unintentionally or intentionally created as part of a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack. In any case, from the point of view of communication networks, both
cases are originated by the eventual channel unavailability and have the same
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potential solution, the use of an alternative channel. Therefore, the availability
of heterogeneous networks could be exploited to overcome this problem.
On the other hand, the different pace of telecommunication and railway
markets implies that the railway signalling systems cannot be attached to
a single wireless technology. Moreover, along the life-cycle of the railway
signalling equipment, new generation wireless technologies will become
ubiquitous in the market. Therefore, new railway corridors or corridor sections
will use these new technologies in order to adopt COTS equipments. From the
communication network’s point of view, effective vertical handovers between
heterogeneous technologies vouch for the coexistence of these technologies.
In this chapter, we analyse the resilience of network communications,
understood as the ability to recover from network disruptions, as it
encompasses both challenges described above. This chapter is structured
as follows. First we describe the general strategies to achieve resilience
and we tailor them to the railway specific need in terms of safety and
security, concluding that redundancy and path diversity are the cornerstones
of resilience. Then, we provide an overview of resilience protocols in other
railway contexts and similar industries. Afterwards, we define the key features
to be fulfilled by a protocol responsible to provide end-to-end resilient
communications in ERTMS. Based on these features, we provide an analysis
of the state of the art present in the literature related to multihoming and
multipath protocol capable to provide path redundancy. This analysis of the
state of the art is divided in different OSI layers and for each technology a
detailed description is provided followed by a critical analysis of the previously
mentioned requirements. Finally, using a semi-quantitative analysis of previous
requirements, we conclude this chapter identifying the most suitable proposal
for including in the NGERTMS and we highlight the open points that should be
addressed before its inclusion in the NGERTMS’s protocol stack.
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3.2 from general resilience disciplines torailway signalling needs
Before going into details of the existing network mechanisms for achieving
communication resilience, there is a need to provide a set of basic definitions
about what the resilience is, and which are the constrains defined by the railway
industry.
Resilience has been traditionally defined as the combination of multiple
disciplines that ensure that a given system can perform the task that it is
defined for, without interruptions produced by errors. A resilient system
is defined as a system that can ensure the trustworthiness in terms of
dependability, security and performability (see Figure 3.8a) [2, 31]. The
dependability quantifies the reliance of a service provided by a system and it is
dependent on availability and reliability, which are described as the readiness
for usage and the continuity of the service respectively [32]. The security
protects from unauthorised access and modification to the system, as well
as to the information delivered to/from it [33]. The performability [34] is the
property of the system to perform according to the service requirements. This
performance can be measured in communication networks for example with
the channel delay, throughput, packet error rate or jitter.
In the railway domain, the dependability is measured using RAMS
requirements [5, 7, 36]. These requirements can be represented as a
dependability tree illustrated in Figure 3.8b. These requirements are generally
extended including security requirements and performance requirements.
In the railway signalling case, the norm EN50126 [4] defines the reliability
requirements to be fulfilled by a railway application, whereas the EN50159
[37] defines the security ones depending on the category of its system. This
categorisation depends on the transmission system used, as well as on the type
of application, i.e. if the application is safety-related or not.
The performance requirements for the concrete case of ERTMS are defined
mainly in two documents; the EIRENE Functional Requirements Specification
[38], which specifies the requirements for the underlying communication
channel provided by GSM-R, and the ERTMS/ETCS SRS Subset 093 [39], which
defines the requirements related to the transmission of ETCS messages. These
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(a) Resilience requirements (b) Dependability tree RAMS [35]
Figure 3.8.: RAMS requirements for a railway resilient system
performance requirements are summarised in Table 3.5, as well as tentative
requirements [1] presented by the Danish railway operator, Banedanmark, for
the performance of ETCS over PS-based technologies and more concretely over
GPRS.
In order to achieve the dependability, security and performability, there are
seven detected enablers [2] that can provide the desired behaviour to the system.
These enablers are:
• Connectivity and association - The end-to-end session should be
maintained even if an underlying stable connection is not available, as far
as the delay does not exceed the maximum specified by the performance
requirements.
• Redundancy - The replication of entities or delivered data in space, time
and information plays a key role for ensuring the resilience. In case of
errors this redundancy prevents a service failure.
• Diversity - It is closely related to redundancy. It prevents correlated errors
when redundant systems are used. Thus, diversity provides disjoint
alternatives for redundancy.
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QoS Parameter Value
Min signal level (95% probability) −92 dBm
G
SM
-R
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
Connection establishment delay of mobile origi-
nated calls
<5 s (95%)
<7.5 (99%)
Connection establishment failure probability (per
attempt)
<10−2
Bit error rate for 4.8 Kbit/s channel <10−4
End-to-end delay (of 30 octet frame) <500 ms
Data rates
2.4, 4.8 and
9.6 Kbit/s
Probability of connection loss <10−2
Maximum break during handover 500 ms
G
PR
S
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
Connection establishment delay:
-GPRS attach
-Packet Data Protocol context activation
-Temporary Block Flow establishment
<250 ms
<250 ms
<1 s
Data Transfer Delay:
- Mean delay for 128 byte packet
- 95% of 128 byte packet delayed
- Mean delay for 1024 byte packet
- 95% of 1024 byte packets delayed
<0.5 s
<1.5 s
<2 s
<7 s
Table 3.5.: Performance requirements over GSM-R and GPRS
• Self-protection and security - It is implemented by numerous security
mechanisms for ensuring entities’ authentication and authorisation, as
well as data confidentiality, integrity and non repudiation.
• Multilevel resilience - Resilience is needed in three dimensions; protocol
layers where the resilience is provided, protocol planes (control, data and
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management) and network architecture. The resilience mechanisms at
different levels are represented in Table 3.6.
Level Mechanism
Application Adaptive applications
Transport Eventual connectivity, erasure codes
Internetworking Heterogeneity, realm diversity
Path Multipath spreading, medium diversity
Topology k-connected, geographic graph diversity
Links and nodes Link error control, fault tolerance
Physical channel Robust coding
Table 3.6.: Levels and selected resilience mechanisms [2].
• Context awareness - It is needed for resilient nodes to be aware of the
network conditions and detect adverse events. The detection of these
events would trigger mechanisms to overcome them.
• Translucency - It is needed to find a trade-off between the degree of
abstraction and the visibility between levels.
Using the enablers mentioned above and summarised in Figure 3.9, it is
expected to achieve an autonomic behaviour able to react automatically against
system failures or malicious attacks. Moreover, the system should always
ensure its adaptability to new situations and should be ready to work with
new technologies coming from the inexorable evolution of the technology.
3.2.1 Communication redundancy approaches as a basis of resilience
A communication system that aims to be resilient should ensure, at different
levels; communication redundancy and diversity - in order to prevent
correlated failures - and, finally, automatic restoration capability. Namely, it
must be able to react automatically for facing unpredictable disruptions.
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Figure 3.9.: Resilience principles
Network redundancy refers to the replication of network entities used in the
communication in order to provide fault-tolerance. So far numerous solutions
addressing redundancy have been presented in the literature.
These solutions can be mainly categorised in the following three main
groups:
Spatial redundancy means the possibility to obtain information for a specific
location from different sources.
Temporal redundancy refers to the act of delivering information more than
once, skewed in time.
Information redundancy is defined as the use of redundant data in order
to detect and allow the reconstruction of data by the receiver in case of
failure.
Another categorisation that can be made is based on the OSI levels.
Depending on the level where the redundancy is applied, the communication is
differently protected. While implementations below the network layer protect a
single link of the communication channel, the approaches deployed above this
56 analysis of network resilient protocols
Figure 3.10.: Redundancy categorisation
layer intent to protect the complete communication channel from the source to
destination. In the case of proposed NGERTMS, the protocol able to exploit redundancy
should be implemented in the OBU and RBC, being able to protect the end-to-end
communication not only from the access network’s failures, but also from core network’s
disruptions. Therefore, the protocol to be implemented should work above to the network
layer. Moreover, when the concurrent use of heterogeneous access technologies
is envisaged, the network layer addressing must be also taken into account.
In fact, each network interface acquires a new address when it is associated
with a new network [40]. Thus, for the railway signalling purposes, end-to-end
redundancy mechanisms should be implemented in upper layers (above the
network layer).
3.3 solutions applied for similar railwaycontexts and industries
Another signalling system used in railways for controlling the safe operation
of vehicles using data communication is named Communication-Based Train
Control (CBTC) [41]. CBTC, currently standardised in accordance with IEEE 1474
series, is mainly used in urban mass transit systems. In these contexts, the use of
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) for establishing the bidirectional wireless
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communication channel is the best choice due to the available commercial-
off-the-shelf equipments [42]. Most existing WLAN-based CBTC networks are
using traditional IEEE 802.11 technologies [43], such as 802.11a/b/g. However,
Communication-based train control networks have stringent requirements for
wireless communication availability and latency [44]. In order to increase
operational security, reliability and availability, a redundant radio network is
implemented. Nevertheless, only one network is active at a time, the other
one remains in quiet back-up mode for ensuring operation continuity. In
[45] and [46] authors propose two WLAN-based train-ground communication
schemes with redundancy to improve the availability in CBTC systems.
The availability is analysed using Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC)
model. The introduced examples illustrate that the proposed schemes with
redundancy can significantly improve the availability of WLAN-based train-
ground communication in CBTC systems.
CBTC can be affected due to continuous movement of the vehicles along the
rail which involves periodical handovers from one Access Point (AP) to another.
In order to overcome this potential problem, in [47] authors propose a handoff
management scheme based on Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
and IEEE 802.11p WLANs to provide high communication availability and low
latency in CBTC networks. The multihoming feature enables the establishment
of a SCTP session over multiple interfaces identified by multiple IP addresses.
Another recent proposal with the aim of improving the resilience in railway
signalling is Rail Safe Transport Application (RaSTA) [48], which is used by the
track field equipments. In correspondence with the requirements of EN50159
the RaSTA protocol ensures safe communications by introducing both, security
and redundancy mechanisms [49] as it is illustrated in Figure 3.11.
For the communication between decentralised field elements in interlocking
systems another architecture named Sinet [50] has been designed with the aim
of offering real-time and high-availability communications. This system, as well
as RaSTA, is a proprietary commercial product for railway market. This system
implements redundancy mechanisms that prioritise operational data while
providing the high system availability required. The redundant connections
between controllers and interlocking are implemented by the standardised
Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) specified in IEC 62439-3 [51]. The protocol
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Figure 3.11.: Architecture of RaSTA
stack where the PRP is introduced is illustrated in Figure 3.12. Thanks to the use
of redundancy, if a single fault in the communication infrastructure occurs, the
services offered over this architecture remain available.
Figure 3.12.: Architecture of Sinet
Another industrial context where resilience is highly required is in the
electric power systems, especially with the emergence of Smart Grids. For
the communications within smart grids, HSR, IEC 62439-3 clause 5 [51], has
been introduced as a protocol to provide resilience [52]. Although HSR has
been criticised due to its unnecessary traffic created due to the duplicated
copies of each sent frame, the standard IEC 61850-90-4 [53] recommends
its use combined with Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) and PRP for
communications in electric substations.
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In electric power systems, the standard IEEE 802.11 has been identified as
unsuitable [54] due to its non-determinism and interference liability which
involve packet loss, exceeded and variable latency times due to retransmissions.
In order to overcome these limitations of IEEE 802.11, in [54] authors propose
the utilisation of PRP over this technology.
The automotive industry is another sector demanding high resilience in
its communications. In [55], authors intend to overcome the relatively high
average error rate of wireless communications by introducing a hybrid
scheme of redundancy combining information and temporal redundancy. They
introduce an incremental redundancy retransmission scheme in conjunction
with concatenated coding and show that this further improves the Deadline
Dependent Coding (DDC) scheme resented by the authors in [56] for improving
the reliability of real-time communication over a wireless channel.
3.4 demanded key features for communica-tion resilient protocol for next gener-ation ertms
As previously mentioned in Section 3.3, the demanded enablers that a resilient
strategy should support to achieve the needed requirements in terms of
dependability, security and performability, are defined by the ResiliNets design
principles [2]. This section provides a tailoring of these enablers to the railway
context. At the same time, this tailoring is adapted to the special requirements
detected for end-host communication protocol stack which is envisaged to be
resilient. Thus, we enrich the general enablers classification proposed in [2] by
specifying their significance in the ERTMS context and introducing additional
requirements.
In order to ensure the Connectivity & association (CA) requirement in ERTMS
the main issue is to guarantee that messages will arrive within their lifetime to
destination. In current communication networks, when the connection is not
disrupted, the delay does not exceed this lifetime because modern Internet
solutions have low delay comparing to the maximum accepted end-to-end
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delay defined in Table 3.5. Therefore, the requirements in this sense are based
on the performance of the communication protocols used at the end-host (RBC
or OBU).
1. End-to-end approach. The evaluated technology should be end-to-end. That
is, only end-hosts should be changed and connection should not be
middle-box dependent.
2. Middle-box compatibility. High percentage of equipments on the current
Internet and packet-switched networks are middle-boxes, e.g. Network
Address Translation (NAT) equipments, firewalls, etc. The protocol chosen
should be fully compatible with these middle-boxes to guarantee correct
performance of communications.
The introduction of Redundancy (R) requirements into NGERTMS protocol
stack would allow achieving higher levels of service performance reliability,
reducing the time that the system will be in degraded mode. Within this general
requirement we identify two specific requirements that must be demanded to
the protocol under analysis:
3. Redundancy capabilities. The protocol should be able to perform multipath
transmissions as a basis of transmission redundancy. That is, the protocol
should allow delivering datagrams through all available interfaces over
the same session.
4. Flexibility of different delivery policies: The redundancy policy should be able
to be adapted to the specific needs of the application. In the redundant
protocol to be implemented in the NGERTMS we envisage to allow three
policies: 1) the active-passive delivery policy (1:1), which makes use of
secondary channels only when the primary one fails; 2) the active-active
delivery policy (1+1), which allows the delivering through all available
channels concurrently; and 3) the utilisation of a single channel.
Closely related to the redundancy, the Diversity (Di) requirement reduces
the possible correlated errors in the communication. This diversity requirement
is achieved in communication networks by providing mechanisms of path
diversity provisioning in the network.
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5. Path diversity. The path diversity mechanisms are usually provided
by network entities that split the redundant traffic through disjoint
paths along the network. The achievement of this capability needs for
interaction with a network entity that controls the network traffic routing.
Additionally, diversity can be achieved by the use of multiple networks
with different service providers. However, it is worth noting that although
the access networks are provided by different service providers, the traffic
in the core network could eventually share routes to the destination.
The Self protection & Security (SS) requirements involve the protection of
data integrity, authenticity and confidentiality, as well as the automatic reaction
against attacks. In ERTMS, these security requirements are addressed by the
Euroradio SFM which is independent to the communication protocol. However,
the redundant communication protocol should not add any additional security
risk. In order to achieve these general requirements, the following specific
requirements must be fulfilled:
6. Dynamical interfaces/addresses configuration. For redundant mobile commu-
nications, the capacity of adding new interfaces/addresses is essential to
adapt to the path availability of each moment.
7. Security. It is important to have a mechanism to guarantee that both sides
are who say they are during the connection establishment. The lack of
this security could allow flow hijacking by an attacker.
The Multilevel resilience (M) mechanisms are summarised in Table 3.6. As
we have commented before, the ERTMS protocol stack should be unaware and
independent to the underlying wireless technology. Moreover, the resilience
mechanisms in the physical channel and the link layer are out of the scope of
our research work, due to the fact that they do not address the resilience need of
the end-to-end communication. Other mechanisms, if not directly provided by
the resilient protocol, they should be at least promoted allowing the interaction
with other network elements.
The end-node should be Context Awareness (CA) in order to detect eventual
disruptions and trigger different measures to overcome them. For this general
requirement two are the specific requirements that a multihoming proposal
should fulfil:
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8. Path state notion. During multipath delivery, it is important to control each
path’s state to know if it is available or not, to avoid waste of resources
with unavailable paths. It is also useful to control the state of each path to
detect events that can affect the path’s characteristics such as interferences
or handoffs.
9. Loss detection and retransmission. The wireless communications in railway
domain have a high data loss probability, when compared to a fixed
communication link. Thus, a mechanism to detect losses and a correct
retransmission policy are essential for correct performance.
The degree of abstraction and visibility between layers is named
Translucency (T). On the one hand, this requirement is tailored to the ERTMS use
case by defining it as the abstraction of the underlying technology that enables
to become ERTMS agnostic to the wireless technology. On the other hand, for
ensuring the compatibility with existing applications, the evaluated proposal
must be wrapped, but keeping the capability to interact with the application
layer.
10. Wireless technology agnosticism. The NGERTMS must be independent to the
underlying communication technology. Moreover, the mobility from one
wireless technology to another (handover) should be transparent to the
ETCS application.
11. Application compatibility. The inclusion of a redundant protocol in the
NGERTMS architecture must be transparent for existing applications.
Moreover, ETCS should be able to work with the new architecture without
any change or adaptation. However, the redundant protocol should
allow the cross-layer interaction with the application for allowing the
exploitation of redundant capabilities by future ETCS versions.
Besides the introduced requirements, some Additional implementation
requirements (A) are detected in order to deploy a resilient protocol
successfully in NGERTMS:
12. Backward compatibility. The introduction of redundant protocol should
not prevent ERTMS node from operating with any legacy standardised
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protocol. It is worth pointing out that when we talk about legacy protocol
we already assume the migration towards TCP/IP protocol stack.
13. Maturity. The maturity of the potential redundant protocol is essential in
the selection of the appropriate candidate. The railway industry is known
for the adoption of well trust reliable technology. The maturity evaluation
of state-of-the-art protocols could be ambiguous. Therefore, we have
adopted the classification presented in [57], which specifies five levels
of maturity: 1) protocol tested in simulation, 2) protocol theoretically
analysed, 3) protocol experimentally analysed, 4) protocol implemented
in real world, and 5) protocol standardised as RFC. Moreover, for the
evaluation of the maturity, the temporal evolution of the proposal must
be analysed since it was proposed for the first time, until it was definitely
standardised.
The evaluation of the candidate proposals present in the literature will be
made in the next section using this set of requirements that we have defined
as RRE. This set of requirements is summarised as a vector of the requirements
associated to each resilience enablers, RRE : {CA, R, Di, SS, M, CA, T, A}.
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3.5 multihoming and multipath solutions forcommunication redundancy
As it is stated in Section 3.2, one of the key enablers to achieve resilience is
the redundancy. Moreover, in Chapter 1 the new trend of equipping multiple
communication transceivers for heterogeneous networks has been introduced.
This trend can be exploited for enabling the redundancy of the train-to-ground
communications in the NGERTMS.
Multipath delivery strategies have been widely used for providing resilience
in communication networks, especially for backbone networks. These strategies
are mainly based on multipath routing algorithms [58], such as the ones applied
over MPLS [59, 60] to improve the QoS metrics (delay, throughput, jitter, etc).
Figure 3.13.: Railway signalling Environment
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In Figure 3.13 the future communication scenario of a train equipped with
multiple transceivers is illustrated. This scenario will be used as a reference for
the study made in this section. For this analysis, the terminology of network
engineering has been adopted. Thus, the train’s OBU has been referenced as
Mobile Node (MN), whereas the RBC has been named as Corresponding Node
(CN).
In this section we analyse the state of the art in multihoming and multipath
proposals in order to evaluate the most suitable one for being used by the
NGERTMS. This study of existing proposals is classified based on the OSI model
layer where they operate as it is illustrated in Figure 3.14. As our goal is to
increase the resilience of end-to-end connections, we analyse proposals that
operate in the network layer or above. In the literature, other alternatives
working bellow the network layer have been proposed [61] for the vehicular
context. However, these alternatives do not have an end-to-end perspective of
the communications. Each of evaluated proposals is set under analysis using
the RRE requirement vector explained before.
Figure 3.14.: Taxonomy of the proposals under analysis
3.5.1 Layer 3 proposals
Most multihoming proposals operating in layer 3 were originally designed to
resolve the mobility problem of traditional IP networks. In IP architectures,
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the network address is at the same time the identifier and the locator. Thus,
when a host or a network changes its address, it changes both, the locator and
identifier, breaking the ongoing sessions of transport layer. In order to address
this problem, the Locator Identifier Split (LIS) concept has been widely use
which is based on the decoupling of both functions in the network layer. As
a result of this split the host or network is able to be identified with a single
and static identifier, while multiple locators are added, allowing multihoming
support.
In the following lines we analyse the most significant proposals which allow
multihoming support in layer 3.
Solutions based on Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)
Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [62] is not originally a multihoming protocol but a protocol
to allow end-node mobility between different edge networks. However, some
extensions of this protocol introduce multihoming. Therefore, it is interesting to
analyse this protocol and its extensions within this evaluation of multihoming
protocols.
MIPv6 was designed to provide mobility to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
end-nodes following the same principle of existing Mobile IPv4 (MIPv4) protocol
[63]. This principle consists on introducing a network element named Home
Agent (HA) which links the address of the end-node in the foreign network,
called Care-of Address (CoA), with its HA keeping the communication with a CN.
This strategy has the side-effect known as "triangle routing" which is produced
by the necessity to forward datagrams encapsulated from CN to MN via the
HA. To reduce this routing inefficiency, MIPv6 introduces the route optimisation
mechanisms that allow updating the CoA not only in the HA but also in the CN
allowing the direct datagram exchange between MN and CN in both directions.
However, MIPv6 does not support new addresses acting as the home address
[64].
Multiple Care-of Address Registration (MCoA) [65] is an extension for MIPv6
that allows the MN to bind multiple CoAs with its HA. In order to distinguish
uniquely each CoA Binding Identification (BID) is introduced. This extension
make possible to use multiple network interfaces by the MN becoming it
multihoming [66–69]. However, this multihoming support is limited to foreign
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edge networks, as inside the home network all datagrams sent to the MN are
routed through the same HA.
Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [70, 71] introduces the mobility capability to
regular IPv6 mobile with no mobility management protocol. This is made by
introducing two network entities, Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) and Mobile
Access Gateway (MAG), which permit to delegate the mobility management to
the network. The functionality of LMA is similar to the HA in MIPv6, whereas
the MAG is the responsible to track the movement of the MN and update the
routes to the MN in the LMA.
PMIPv6 enables the mobility, but it has limitations for supporting a host
with multiple interfaces attaching to the PMIPv6 domain. In order to address
this problem, Proxy Mobile IPv6 - MAG Address Translation (PMIPv6-MAT) has
been proposed [72]. This proposal allows the continuous datagram delivery
while handovers between heterogeneous access technologies are performed. In
PMIPv6-MAT the LMA maintains binding entries for each interface and can sustain
separate routes for each interface.
Fast Mobile IPv6 Handover (FMIPv6) [73] has been designed to overcome
latencies of IP reconfiguration and to bind updates. The mobile source
anticipates a handover, and receives its new CoA as part of a Fast Binding
Acknowledgement (FBACK) prior to disconnecting. This make-before-break
strategy enhances the handover process by allowing the registration of multiple
CoA, becoming the node multihoming. However, during this process the
tunnelling to a New Access Router (NAR) of one interface can incur performance
degradation due to severe packet reordering when multiple interfaces are
simultaneously used for load sharing. This is because the partial traffic flow
coming from the interface involved in handover is suspended during this
process and, later, tunnelled to a NAR, while the other partial traffic flow is
continuously forwarded to the mobile node through other stable interfaces.
Identifier Locator Network Protocol (ILNP)
Identifier/Locator Network Protocol (ILNP) [74–77] addresses are split in two
parts, the locator and the identifier. The locator is linked to the network
topology and it can change when the end-node change from one network to
another, whereas the identifier remains more static, at least while the transport
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layer session is active. Although there are ILNP versions for IPv4 and IPv6, the
last one offers further capabilities as it permits to keep the IPv6 header which
enables the compatibility with non-ILNP architectures. By contrary, the IPv4
version needs for a new IPv4 Option to carry the Identifier values.
This new scheme assigns more than one valid locators to the multihomed
end-nodes. When one stream connection fails, the node sends an Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Locator Update message to each existing
correspondent node to remove the unavailable Locator from the set of valid
Locators. Thanks to this locator-identifier decoupling, ILNP permits to hide
the multihoming to the transport protocol as it uses the identifier values for
establishing its sessions. Moreover, ILNP enables multipath delivery without
adapting the transport protocol. Thus, any transport protocol can use multiple
paths concurrently, simply by using multiple (valid) locator values in that
session’s ILNP packets.
Global Locator, Local Locator, and Identifier Split (GLI-Split)
Global Locator, Local Locator, and Identifier Split (GLI-Split) [78], similar to
ILNP, introduces the decoupling of locator and identifier functionalities of IP
addresses. Nevertheless, GLI-Split splits the IP address into global locators, local
locators, and identifiers with IDs that are independent of the current location.
These IDs and locators are encoded in regular IPv6 addresses so that no new
routing protocols are required. Thus, GLI-Split allows the backward compatibility
with non-GLI-Split IPv6 nodes and network elements. Furthermore, the GLI-Split
mechanism remains transparent for the transport layer which is only aware of
the equivalent IPv6 address.
The splitting of the IPv6 address in three different GLI addresses is shown
in the Figure 3.16. The 64 higher-order bits of each address are used for
routing and special tasks, whereas the 64 lower-order bits contain an identifier.
These addresses contain GLI-prefixes, used to differentiate them from other IPv6
addresses, and markers to determine whether the locator is local or global.
This protocol allows not only the network mobility, but also the multihoming,
multipath-routing and traffic engineering. When source and destination
networks are multihomed, multipath routing can be performed between the
gateways of both networks. In order to do so, the GLI-node must request to the
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(a) IPv6 header
(b) ILNP header
Figure 3.15.: IPv6 vs ILNP header
mapping system the global GLI-addresses of its domain and the one of the CN.
Each combination of global source and destination GLI-addresses represents
a different path. During the data delivery, the GLI-node selects the local GLI-
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Figure 3.16.: GLI-Split addresses
gateway for its outgoing traffic and uses the appropriate global GLI-address for
the destination node to select a specific GLI-gateway in the destination domain.
Mobility and Multihoming Supporting Identifier Locator Split Architecture (MILSA)
Mobility and Multihoming supporting Identifier Locator Split Architecture
(MILSA) [79] similarly to GLI-Split and ILNP aims to provide mobility and
multihoming support by decoupling the identifier and location functions of
the network layer. This approach was firstly introduced based on the following
main key designs [80]: a hierarchical identifiers system, a trust relationship
based on the hierarchical structure, identifier-locator split and signalling and
data plane separation. This original design permitted the use of applications,
without any need to be modified, to benefit from this architecture. However,
the proposed hierarchical identifiers were not compatible with legacy IP
addressing.
From this proposal, the design of MILSA has been enhanced [81, 82]
introducing a new MILSA identifier of 128 bits, compatible with IPv6 addressing.
In [79] the capability of MILSA for exploiting the path diversity through site
multihoming is highlighted. Concretely, authors investigate the possibility of
enabling multihoming networks to improve the performance of TCP connections
coming from-to them by adding path diversity and enhancing the performance
in case of path congestion/failure.
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Requirements Analysis of Layer 3 proposals
As seen previously, MIPv6-based proposals have no end-to-end approach as they
are all dependent of a HA or another middle-box such as a MAG or a NAR.
However, as it keeps the structure of the IPv6 header, using the extensions
headers for carrying the information related with mobility, they are fully
compatible with network elements. From the redundancy capability point of
view, MIPv6 has not a native redundancy support. However, the introduction
of MCoA allows the multihoming support, associating different CoA to each
network interface. In the case of FMIPv6 this multihoming support is exploited
for performing fast handovers. As MIPv6-based proposals are designed for
managing the node mobility, they are able to detect new interface configuration
produced by the association of the node to a new network. This dynamic
mechanism does not provide any security for preventing the session hijacking
by an attacker. However, security mechanisms for authenticating the end-
nodes can be deployed using Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) or another
cryptographic algorithm at upper layers. These proposals do not implement
any context awareness mechanisms as they are designed to manage mobility,
delegating these functions to upper layers. MIPv6-based proposals fulfil all
translucency requirements as they are all agnostic to the wireless technology
and the application must not be adapted to exploit their functionalities.
Moreover, they are all designed having in mind the backward compatibility,
as soon as the legacy application is able to work with IPv6. Although presented
proposals are stable RFC standards, the lack of any new proposal for exploiting
their multihoming capability since 2009 illustrated in Figure 3.17 is considered
a drawback. All in all, according this analysis, summarised in Table 3.7, the RRE
vector defined in Section 3.4 has the following value (1):
RREMIPv6 : {1, 1, X, 1, X, 0, 2, 1} (1)
ILNP fulfils the connectivity and association requirements defined in Section
3.4 as it has an end-to-end communication approach and does not need from
any intermediate network element. Additionally, as it introduces the identifier
and locator respecting the IPv6 header structure, it is fully compatible with
network middle-boxes. As mentioned above in Section 3.5.1, ILNP provides not
only multihoming support, but also multipath delivery capability. However,
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ILNP does not provide any flexibility for implementing different delivery
policies. From the point of view of self protection and security, ILNP provides a
mechanism for a dynamic interface configuration, but it does not implement
any security mechanism delegating this function to upper layer protocols.
Although ILNP is a layer 3 protocol, it makes a relative path state analysis
as it detects the path failure and overcomes it sending ICMP Locator Update.
However, it does not implement any loss detection and retransmission
mechanism. Equally to MIPv6-based proposals, ILNP fulfils the translucency
requirements, as well as the backward compatibility with no ILNP-capable
nodes. The first reference to this proposal was in 2006 [77] and it was
standardised in 2012, RFC6740. Recently, it has not been used as a referential
multihoming/multipath protocol in any project. Taking all this into account the
RRE vector for ILNP has the following value (2):
RREILNP : {2, 1, X, 1, X, 1, 2, 2} (2)
GLI-Split, as it follows a very similar approach to ILNP, has a very similar
RRE vector. However, unlike ILNP, GLI-Split provides no path state awareness
mechanism. Additionally, although GLI-Split was proposed more recently, in
2010 [83], there is no ongoing standardisation process. Actually, it has only
been proposed in two papers [78, 83]. The RRE vector for GLI-Split has then the
following value (3):
RREGLI−Split : {2, 1, X, 1, X, 0, 2, 1} (3)
First MILSA proposal [80] introduced a disruptive hierarchical network
architecture that was not fully compatible with IP nodes. However, this
compatibility problem has been overcome in the last versions of the proposal
[81, 82]. Nevertheless, the architecture makes use of intermediate network
elements for the identifier/locator resolution. Thus, it has no end-to-end
approach. MILSA fulfils almost the same requirements of ILNP with the exception
of redundancy capability, which is not introduced, and the maturity, as since
2010 has not been used and has never been standardised. Comparing to other
proposals, MILSA introduces a more sophisticate path state notion as it is able
to detect failures and congestion situation of the TCP session and redirect the
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traffic through other path, exploiting its multihoming capability. All in all, the
RRE vector for MILSA has the following value (4):
RREMILSA : {1, 0, X, 1, X, 1, 2, 1} (4)
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Requirements
Layer 3 proposals
MIPv6
extensions
ILNP
GLI-
Split
MILSA
General for
resilience
Specific for a re-
dundant protocol
Connectivity &
association (CA)
End-to-end
approach
7 3 3 7
Middle-box com-
patibility
3 3 3 3
Redundancy (R)
Redundancy capa-
bilities
3 3 3 3
Flexibility of
different delivery
policies
7 7 7 7
Diversity (Di) Path diversity - - - -
Self protection &
security (SS)
Dynamical inter-
faces/addresses
configuration
3 3 3 3
Security 7 7 7 7
Multilevel
resilience (M)
Multilevel
resilience (M)
- - - -
Context
awareness (CA)
Path state notion 7 3 7 3
Loss
detection and
retransmission
7 7 7 7
Translucency (T)
Wireless
technology
agnosticism
3 3 3 3
Application com-
patibility
3 3 3 3
Additional
implementation
requirements (A)
Backward compat-
ibility
3 3 3 3
Maturity 3 3 7 7
Table 3.7.: Requirement analysis of Layer 3 proposals
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3.5.2 Layer 3.5 proposals
Several proposals in the literature are based on the introduction of an additional
layer between the network and transport layers. These proposals were originally
also designed mainly for providing mobility support. However, unlike the
proposals working in the layer 3, the LIS concept is made by introducing an
identifier in the layer 3.5, while the IP address is kept as network locator.
Host Identity Protocol
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) is defined in [84–87] and it has been proposed
to solve limitations produced in the current Internet architecture by the dual
role of IP. HIP is a protocol that works between the network and the transport
level and identifies the host independently of the IP addressing. That is, a
host can change the IP address or can have more than one assigned address
with no effect to upper layer, because it is no longer identified by IP address.
Instead, a Host Identity Tag (HIT) will be used, which is a generated combining
a cryptographic hash of 100 bits, coming from host’s public key, and a special
prefix of 28 bits. This HIT, which has IPv6 format, is used by upper layers as a
regular IP address, blinding the HIP functionalities to higher layers.
HIP has a native multihoming support and with a protocol extension
proposed in [88], an end-user is also able to delivery concurrently through
multiple available paths. As in this proposal IP addresses are used for routing
and not as locators, the node that implements HIP has a native mobility support
because the node can change the IP address, changing from one network
to another, and it just must inform the other side with an address update
message. Thus, the mobility, due to the physical movement of the user or
due to connection disruptions in the preliminary network, is transparent for
the transport layer protocol providing fault tolerance. The HIT-IP translation
is made extending the functionalities of Domain Name System (DNS) [89].
However, DNS entries for locator resolution are not updated fast enough to
face the host mobility, containing outdated entries. To solve this limitation, the
RendezVous Server (RSV) extension was introduced [90], which stores the HIT
and its associated IP addresses.
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Figure 3.18.: RANGI’s host locator structure
The biggest disadvantage of HIP is that both sides must have implemented the
protocol to be able to communicate each other. Furthermore, network services,
such as NATs and DNS name services, should be upgraded with HIP options in
order to understand the protocol and do not drop its traffic, in the first case,
and make the correct hostname-HIT translation in the second case.
Routing Architecture for the Next Generation Internet
Routing Architecture for the Next Generation Internet (RANGI) [91] presents an
approach for LIS very similar to the one proposed by HIP. Like HIP, RANGI also
introduces a host identifier layer between the network and the transport layers.
However, unlike HIP, RANGI adopts a hierarchical and cryptographic host ID
structure. This hierarchical structure is one of the main characteristics of RANGI.
In fact, before being known as RANGI, this architecture proposal was named
as Hierarchical Routing Architecture (HRA) [92]. RANGI uses IPv4-embeded IPv6
addresses as locator as illustrated in Figure 3.18.
For the host ID mapping, RANGI proposes a combination of two mapping
system, one for Domain-Host ID and another for Host ID-Locator translation.
For the first one, the use of DNS servers is proposed, whereas for the second
mapping a distributed system can be used. When RANGI host moves from one
network to another, it acquires a new locator that must be updated to the Host
ID-Locator mapping server.
When a RANGI host is located in multihomed site, it can define the source
locator that will be used for outgoing traffic. That is, traffic engineering to
exploit multihoming can be made.
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Node Identity Internetworking Architecture
Node Identity Internetworking Architecture (NIIA) was introduced [93–95] to
allow routing along heterogeneous network domains. This proposal provides
mobility and multihoming support based on the introduction of a new Node
Identifier (NID) layer on top of the network layer. This way, a node with multiple
interfaces can register in multiple locator domains at the same time. Unlike
other approaches, NIIA needs for a changes in the current Internet routing
architecture. The routing in this architecture is based on two approaches
depending on the domain where it is applied. When routing is done within
a local domain, the internal routing scheme is used wherever it is (e.g. IPv4,
IPv6, MPLS, global and private address spaces, MAC addresses, etc). However,
when traffic traverses different domains, the routing is only based on the NID
of involved nodes.
The identifiers used in the NIIA proposal are based on cryptographic
identifiers like in HIP in order to ensure end-to-end security.
Site Multihoming by IPv6 Intermediation
Site Multihoming by IPv6 Intermediation (Shim6) [96–98] is a multihoming
protocol that, similarly to HIP introduces a new protocol layer between the
network and transport layers. This new layer allows the application of LIS
concept by introducing a new identifier name space known as Upper-Layer
Identifiers (ULID). Therefore, the transport protocol session will remain working
although the locator is changed in the network layer as the ULID is used for
identifying the end-host, whereas the locator is used for the routing through
each interface.
Shim6 provides loss detection and recovery functionalities by the Reachability
Protocol (REAP) [99]. This detection can be performed in two ways; using
keep-alive mechanisms that check the reachability of each destination locator,
or using information of the transport layer. In any case, this functionality
is independent to upper layer. Additionally, REAP also introduces recovery
functionality through the detection of new locator pairs when failures occur.
REAP protocol can be improved for faster detection of new locator during
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node mobility [100]; however, some authors [98] have demonstrated that this
detection is not fast enough for real-time applications.
Unlike HIP hosts, Shim6 hosts are able to communicate with non-Shim6 nodes
due to its association process. It performs a 4-way handshake like in HIP, but
the first two messages are used to check that both sides have Shim6 support and
if not, conventional IPv6 is used. In affirmative case, the next two messages are
used for exchanging locator sets.
The functionalities of Shim6 can be turned on/off from the application using
an available API which allows the network interface management [101].
Requirements Analysis of Layer 3.5 proposals
Probably, the two most used protocols in the 3.5 layer which provide
multihoming support are HIP and Shim6. All proposals working in the 3.5
level are designed with the philosophy of splitting the locator and identifier
functions that currently fall to network layer. In order to do that, all of them
introduce an additional identifier, whereas the IP addressing is kept. From
the connectivity and association requirements point of view, HIP, RANGI, NIIA
and Shim6 fulfil the end-to-end approach requirement, but not the middle-box
compatibility. This is because the introduction of a new protocol between the
network and transport layer is not always recognised by NATs and firewalls
that are deployed to work with the standard TCP/IP protocol stack. Moreover,
in the case of NIIA, a new internet routing architecture is introduced making
more complex the interoperability with legacy networks. These protocols are
designed mainly to provide secure mobility between different networks, so
they all implement mechanisms for dynamical interface configurations and
they are all agnostic to the wireless technology. By contrary, none of them
implement loss detection and retransmission mechanisms, delegating these
functions to upper layers. Additionally, all the presented proposals incorporate
cryptographic end-to-end security mechanisms that prevent from session
hijackings.
HIP protocol provides multihoming support, but by default it does not
implement multipath delivery. However, the extension for implementing
this capability, named Multipath Host Identity Protocol (mHIP), has been
presented and deployed [102]. Thus, HIP can implement a failover multihoming
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mechanism, as well as load-balancing using mHIP extension. However, neither
HIP, nor mHIP, provides a flexible mechanism for setting up different delivery
policies. HIP can maintain notion of the path state using heartbeat messages
between HIP entities or analysing TCP traffic when this protocol is used at the
transport layer. This protocol can be used by a legacy application able to work
with IPv6, as the HIT used respects the IPv6 address format. However, one of the
main inconvenient of HIP is that it is not backward compatible with non-HIP
nodes, that is, both sides must understand HIP otherwise the communication
will not occur. One of the positive aspects of HIP is its maturity, as it is not
only standardised since 2008, but a new version of HIP is under standardisation
process since 2015 as can be seen in the chronology graph of Figure 3.19. All in
all, the RRE vector for HIP has the following value (5) according to Table 3.8:
RREHIP : {1, 1, X, 2, X, 1, 2, 1} (5)
As commented previously in the description of RANGI, this proposal is very
similar to HIP, but it differs with it in some point. Unlike HIP, RANGI does
not have any extension for providing multipath capability. It only provides
multihoming, but it is not able to deliver data concurrently through multiple
interfaces. Another characteristic from HIP that it is not available in RANGI is
the path state awareness. Like in HIP, backward compatibility is not fulfilled
as both sides must understand RANGI protocol to communicate. However, the
compatibility with legacy application is guaranteed as it uses IPv6 addressing
as identifier/locator structure. Moreover, it uses IPv4-embeded IPv6 as locator
address enabling its compatibility with IPv4 networks. From the maturity point
of view, this proposal was published in 2008 and it started a standardisation
process in 2009 without success. Since that moment, no new proposal has been
made based on it. Thus, the RRE vector for RANGI has the following value (6):
RRERANGI : {1, 0, X, 2, X, 0, 2, 0} (6)
NIIA proposal, like RANGI, supports multihoming but it does not implement
multipath capability reducing the redundancy possibilities. It does not
implement any path state awareness mechanism and it is not backwards
compatible. However, like other proposals, it can be used with legacy
applications as long as they are ready to work over IPv6. As it can be seen in the
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chronology graph of Figure 3.19, this proposal was proposed for the first time in
2006 and its last mention was in 2010 with no standardisation process planned.
Therefore it cannot be considered a mature technology, giving as result the
following RRE value (7):
RRENIIA : {1, 0, X, 2, X, 0, 2, 0} (7)
Last, but not least, the described Shim6 is one of the most prominent layer 3.5
multihoming protocol of the literature. It was standardised in 2009 and it is a
mature technology used by many authors for enhancing the node mobility. It
provides concurrent multipath capabilities, allowing using multiple interfaces
for failover or load-sharing purposes. However, it is not possible to define
new delivery policies to exploit this multipath capability. For the path state
monitoring, it uses timestamps introduced in the transmitted packets and keep-
alive messages, so it is able to detect path failure or a degradation of the
channel conditions. Shim6 is designed to preserve the compatibility with legacy
applications as well as with non-Shim6 equipment. However, for exploiting
all multihoming capabilities, the use of a new API by the application layer is
needed, and both sides must have Shim6 support. The RRE vector for Shim6 has
the following value (8) according to Table 3.8:
RREShim6 : {1, 1, X, 2, X, 1, 2, 2} (8)
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Requirements
Layer 3.5 proposals
HIP RANGI NIIA Shim6
General for
resilience
Specific for a redun-
dant protocol
Connectivity &
association (CA)
End-to-end approach 3 3 3 3
Middle-box compati-
bility
7 7 7 7
Redundancy (R)
Redundancy capabil-
ities
3 3 3 3
Flexibility of differ-
ent delivery policies
7 7 7 7
Diversity (Di) Path diversity - - - -
Self protection &
security (SS)
Dynamical
interfaces/addresses
configuration
3 3 3 3
Security 3 3 3 3
Multilevel resilience
(M)
Multilevel resilience
(M)
- - - -
Context awareness
(CA)
Path state notion 3 7 7 3
Loss detection and
retransmission
7 7 7 7
Translucency (T)
Wireless technology
agnosticism
3 3 3 3
Application compati-
bility
3 3 3 3
Additional
implementation
requirements (A)
Backward
compatibility
7 7 7 3
Maturity 3 7 7 3
Table 3.8.: Requirement analysis of Layer 3.5 proposals
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3.5.3 Layer 4 proposals
Stream Control Transmission Protocol
SCTP [106–109] is a connection-oriented transport protocol as TCP, but its
connection conception goes further than TCP’s. SCTP creates a connection
between SCTP endpoints which can include multiple IP addresses combined
with SCTP ports where packets can be transmitted with assured reliability.
That is, its native multihoming support is one of its basis for connection
reliability. As multiple paths can be established within a single connection,
the protocol defines control messages, heartbeats, to check the status of each
path (active or inactive). Moreover, as SCTP uses Selective Acknowledgement
(SACK) mechanism, it is able to measure accurately the RTT of each path. By
default, only the primary path is used for data delivery, and only in case
this path fails; alternative paths are used as a fault tolerance mechanism. This
delivery change is done by SCTP automatically and in a transparent way for
the application. However, the application must be adapted to work with SCTP
as its socket definition is different to the ones for TCP and User Datagram
Protocol (UDP). The failover mechanisms of SCTP are analysed in-depth in the
PhD thesis [110], which proposes SCTP as transport layer multihoming protocol
for providing end-to-end network fault tolerance and improved application
performance. Taking the native multihoming support of SCTP as a reference,
some extensions to the protocol have been proposed for adding multipath
support [111, 112], as well as for handling the mobility [113–115]. This is
the case of Concurrent Multipath Transfer (CMT) extension [116] and the
Dynamic Address Reconfiguration extension [115] respectively. In [117] another
concurrent multipath transfer scheme is proposed that makes uses also of
address dynamic configuration to perform seamless vertical handovers. The
first one makes use of different available path for delivering data concurrently
through them. The second one permits the IP address reconfiguration allowing
the change from one network to another transparently for the application.
The biggest handicaps of SCTP are two. One is the lack of compatibility with
the current middleboxes present in the current networks, such as NATs and
firewalls, which don’t understand SCTP and can drop SCTP messages. The
second one is the lack of compatibility with legacy applications due to the
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differentiated interfaces used by SCTP for communicating with applications
with respect to ones used by TCP and UDP.
Multipath Transmission Control Protocol
MPTCP [118, 119] has been created as an extension to the well known
reliable transport protocol TCP and it allows creating simultaneously multiple
communication paths over the same logical connection between two end-hosts.
As MPTCP is an extension, both sides have to inform each other if they are
capable to understand MPTCP or if they only understand regular TCP protocol.
This information is shared during the first TCP connection establishment,
adding the information to the TCP header options. MPTCP works at the transport
layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack and it obtains an abstraction of the eventual
changes that can happen in the network layer such as the address change
produced by network mobility. This abstraction hides to upper layers the
possible faults occurred at underlying levels to the transport protocol. Thus,
it is not required to change the application to benefit from MPTCP functions.
However, for a full control of MPTCP functionalities from the application, a
special API has been released [120].
MPTCP manages the reaction against failures redistributing the traffic through
alternative paths providing fault tolerance to serve applications. Thanks to this
capability MPTCP is able to keep the service working without any interruption.
Additionally to the multihoming and multipath support, MPTCP specification
lets open the delivery policy to use by the implementation. This way, this
policy can be designed to fulfil resilient services adapting the subflow selection
whereby the end-host will deliver the service data in accordance to different
networks’ state. Thus, MPTCP permits the pre-emption of some paths from
another for achieving the best recovery policy after a network failure is detected.
By default, MPTCP delivers data segments through the subflow with lowest SRTT
and the congestion control across subflows is presented in [121].
Likewise MPTCP, other approaches before intended to provide multihoming
support through the utilisation of multiple TCP flows. This is the case
of Multiple TCP Fairness proposal [122] which allows the application to
employ multiple TCP instances. The issue with this approach resides on the
independence of each data path. For instance, it is hard to guarantee that
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multiple TCP instances do not use more bandwidth than a single TCP instance
over the path. Another variant of TCP with the same goal was presented in
[123], which uses Fast TCP [124] as a base for introducing multihoming support,
but which is sensitive to throughput problems, namely, on network congestion
situations.
Taking MPTCP as a reference, multiple proposals have been made for
improving network reliability in heterogeneous networks. One of most relevant
approaches is the use of Network Coding (NC) in combination with MPTCP
[125, 126]. This approach incorporates the previous knowledge of Network
Coding in regular TCP [127, 128], consisting on delivering information of
previous packets so that in case of message corruption or loss, the message
can be recovered without triggering retransmissions. Special interest of this
technology combination has been shown for mobile devices working over
heterogeneous [129] and mesh networks [130]. However, the advantage of
NC cannot be exploited in the specific case of ERTMS as the interval between
consecutive ETCS messages is so long and the message size so small that the
fact of sending this additional information does not provide any additional
benefit with respect to the simply duplicate delivered packets. Moreover, it
would produce higher computational cost, therefore higher delay.
End-to-end Connection Control Protocol
The End-to-end Connection Control Protocol (ECCP) [131] is a protocol that
works under the transport layer and it allows hosts to communicate over
multiple interfaces seamlessly to the transport protocol. Its conception is similar
to HIP protocol because it creates a new local identifier for each flow that hides
the different connections that are associated to the flow. This flow identifier
is local, so each end-host has its own one for identifying the flow in its side.
Thus, to keep coherence in the subflow, both sides must exchange their flow
identifiers during a flow establishment process. Unlike layer 3.5 proposals, such
as HIP, ECCP deals with the connection control instead of creating a new host
identifier for satisfying LIS concept. Moreover, ECCP does not need any special
host identifier; it only needs a destination host address to initiate the connection.
During the establishment process a list of available interfaces of each end-host is
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also exchanged, so that after the flow is established, different associated subflow
can be created using these addresses.
Like HIP, ECCP does not define any reliability or congestion control
mechanism by itself. Instead, it relies in the existing transport layer below to
perform these functions. In ECCP, the IP addresses associated to a subflow and
the addresses added to the available address list can be changed on-the-fly with
no service disruption thanks to a resynchronise protocol used for updating
peers when the end-host changes its addresses.
Practical End-host Multihoming
Practical End-host Multihoming (PERM) [132] is a proposal that permits the
flow scheduling in multihomed hosts. The goal of this proposal is to allow
end-users to share their Internet connections in residential networks, this way
enhancing the connection performance. The particularity of PERM is that it
analyses the end-users’ networking behaviour and based on it, it exploits the
recognised patterns for improving the connection performance by adopting
different scheduling policies at the flow level. This proposal supports three
general functionalities; the detection of new flows request and its binding to a
link, the monitoring of link performances and the flow decision for scheduling
traffic.
PERM’s implementation is designed as an extension of Linux socket API which
incorporates the following six components:
• Connection Manager - This element intercepts calls to the socket API and it
triggers the flow scheduling.
• Monitor - It monitors the link state for detecting failures and for estimating
its capacity and latency.
• User Traffic Prediction - It is used for determining the amount of traffic that
will be introduced in the flow before the flow is scheduled.
• Incentive Management - This component monitors the Internet connection
and interacts with other user’s PERM’s managers for exchanging the
scheduling information.
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• Privacy and Security - Its enforce privacy by preventing neighbours
from gaining unintended access to important sites through the local
connection.
• Flow Scheduling - Depending on the estimated flow volume, the load
of a link and the respective associated RTT, PERM adapts between
scheduling based on latency for light-volume flows and scheduling based
on estimated transmission time for load balancing among heavy-volume
flows.
Multipath UDP
An approach for multipath scheduling for UDP is introduced in [133]. This
proposal, unlike others presented above, is not a protocol or new layer but an
algorithm for addressing the delivery problem under UDP. In fact, this proposal
can be considered as a cross-layer approach as it is the IP layer of the sender the
responsible of splitting the traffic between available paths. However, as the end-
to-end streaming mechanism for forwarding packets over different interfaces
is based on transport protocol peculiarities, we have categorised it as a layer 4
proposal.
The main goal of this approach is to facilitate UDP to schedule transmission
of packets over multiple paths in such a way that they are received at
the destination in-order while imposing the minimum overall delay on the
receiver’s application. In order to do that, the packets are reordered in the
sender based on the transmission delay of its path and they are consequently
delivered for achieving the goal mentioned before. The main drawback of this
proposal is that, in order to perform the reordering in the sender, data must
be available before the transmission begins. Therefore, big buffers are needed
in the sender, and more important, the approach affects directly to application
with high delay constrains, such as the railway signalling.
Requirements Analysis of Layer 4 proposals
All described proposals share common characteristics for being protocols
working in the layer 4, such as the end-to-end approach and their agnosticism
with the underlying wireless technology. According to the chronology graph
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illustrate din Figure 3.20, from introduced proposals the only two that can
be considered mature are SCTP and MPTCP. ECCP has been formally verified,
but since it was proposed in 2012, no other work has been presented based
on it. Another point coincident between almost all proposals of this section
is their compatibility with legacy middle-boxes, e.g. NATs and firewalls, with
the exception of SCTP. The main problem of SCTP in this sense is its moderate
deployment in current networks comparing to TCP and UDP. Consequently,
many NATs and firewalls do not understand this protocol. By contrary, MPTCP,
PERM and Multipath UDP (MPUDP) make use of regular TCP and UDP packets
to their traffic, which both are compatible with these equipments. In the case
of ECCP, although it introduces new headers, it is encapsulated over UDP
packets to avoid compatibility problems. All of these proposals provide not
only multihoming support, but also multipath feature. In some cases, such as
SCTP and MPTCP, the delivery policy can be adapted being available different
schedulers, i.e. round-robin, bandwidth aware, load-sharing, etc. In ECCP and
MPUDP this feature is not introduced, whereas in PERM a new hybrid scheduling
is incorporated which decides the path to be used depending on channel
conditions and application needs.
MPTCP, SCTP and ECCP, unlike MPUDP and PERM, have mechanisms for the
dynamic interface configuration. In fact, PERM has been designed for residential
purposes where the change of address configuration as a consequence of
mobility is not common. MPTCP, SCTP and ECCP make use of random keys,
nonces, exchanged during the session establishment for preventing session
hijacking. However, this mechanism only protects from off-path entities,
i.e. entities that are not aware of these nonces. PERM incorporates a more
sophisticated privacy enforcement mainly designed to hide user traffic pattern
between neighbours sharing the same connection.
SCTP is a reliable transport protocol; therefore its multipath extensions have
native loss detection and retransmission mechanisms. Additionally, for the
detection of path state, SCTP uses heartbeat messages. The main backward of
SCTP is the lack of compatibility with former applications. The use of an API
designed for SCTP is mandatory, being necessary to adapt former applications
to work with it. Additionally, the multipath extensions of SCTP do not introduce
any backwards compatibility mechanism during the session establishment,
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while they introduce a subflow level sequence numbering, making them
incompatible with regular SCTP. The main advantage of SCTP is its maturity
as it has been standardised and many works are present in the literature for
its use as multipath protocol. All in al the RRE vector of SCTP has the following
value (9):
RRESCTP : {1, 2, X, 2, X, 2, 1, 1} (9)
MPTCP differs from SCTP in the implicit mechanism it uses for detecting the
path state. MPTCP makes use of subflow SRTT for being aware of its state. MPTCP,
likewise SCTP, has loss and retransmission mechanism as it is an extension
of the reliable transport protocol TCP. Unlike SCTP, MPTCP is designed for
being compatible with existing applications, and for keeping the backward
compatibility with regular TCP. In order to guarantee these two compatibilities,
MPTCP uses the default TCP/IP API and incorporates a negotiation during the
session establishment where the MPTCP capability is advertised to the other
side. When this capability does not exist in both sides the session is established
as a regular TCP. MPTCP is standardised and it is being incorporated by the
industry for mobile devices where vertical handovers are common; and data
centres, where the load-balancing provides reliability and higher throughput.
The RRE value for MPTCP has the following value (10):
RREMPTP : {2, 2, X, 2, X, 2, 2, 2} (10)
ECCP does not provide any path state awareness mechanism, but it provides
a loss detection and retransmission mechanisms based on timeouts. From the
compatibility point of view, as ECCP is located below TCP, the used API by the
applications remains. However, both sides must understand ECCP in order to
communicate each other as the ECCP node introduces ECCP headers that would
not be understandable for non-ECCP node. From the maturity point of view,
although ECCP has been formally verified, it has never been standardised and,
since 2012, no reference to ECCP has appeared in the literature. The RRE value
for ECCP corresponds to the following value (11):
RREECCP : {2, 1, X, 2, X, 1, 2, 0} (11)
PERM provides a mechanism for detecting the path state, actually this
measurement is the base for its hybrid flow scheduler. However, it delegates
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the loss detection and retransmission to the transport protocol. PERM nodes
are able to communicate with non-PERM nodes as this protocol only change
the scheduling in the sender without altering the packet. Nevertheless, to use
PERM in a node, new API is required, that is, PERM is not compatible with legacy
applications. PERM has not been standardised and, since it was presented in
2006, it has not been used any more. Thus it cannot be considered a mature
protocol. The corresponding RRE vector for PERM is (12):
RREPERM : {2, 2, X, 1, X, 1, 2, 0} (12)
Last but not least, MPUDP incorporates a path awareness mechanism based
on the measurement of the paths’ RTT. However, it does not introduce any
loss detection and retransmission mechanism, delegating these functions to
upper layers. MPUDP guarantees the backward compatibility with both, legacy
applications and non-MPUDP nodes. This proposal, although its last reference
in the literature was in 2015, it has not been standardised, so it cannot be
considered mature enough. The RRE vector for MPUDP has the following value
(13) according to Table 3.9:
RREMPUDP : {2, 1, X, 0, X, 1, 2, 1} (13)
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Requirements
Layer 4 proposals
SCTP MPTCP ECCP PERM MPUDP
General for
resilience
Specific for
a redundant
protocol
Connectivity &
association (CA)
End-to-end
approach
3 3 3 3 3
Middle-box com-
patibility
7 3 3 3 3
Redundancy (R)
Redundancy ca-
pabilities
3 3 3 3 3
Flexibility
of different
delivery policies
3 3 7 3 7
Diversity (Di) Path diversity - - - - -
Self protection &
security (SS)
Dynamical inter-
faces/addresses
configuration
3 3 3 7 7
Security 3 3 3 3 7
Multilevel
resilience (M)
Multilevel
resilience
- - - - -
Context
awareness (CA)
Path state notion 3 3 7 3 3
Loss
detection and
retransmission
3 3 3 7 7
Translucency (T)
Wireless technol-
ogy agnosticism
3 3 3 3 3
Application com-
patibility
7 3 3 7 3
Additional
implementation
requirements (A)
Backward
compatibility
7 3 7 3 3
Maturity 3 3 7 7 7
Table 3.9.: Requirement analysis of Layer 4 proposals
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3.5.4 Layer 5 proposals
SIP-based solutions
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) works in the application layer and has been
designed for establishing, modifying and closing end-to-end sessions for
multimedia applications. SIP is not a multihoming protocol as it has not
the capability for working simultaneously with multiple network instances.
However, it decouples the node identifier and the network address using
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)s for its identification process. Due to this
fact, SIP eases the dynamical change of network address enhancing the mobility
performance [142].
Although SIP is not a multihoming protocol, it has been widely proposed as
an enabler for enhancing other multihoming protocols’ performances. This is
the case of [143] which intends to enhance the Media Independent Handover
(MIH)-based [144] network mobility by introducing SIP. This proposal works
as follows, when SIP-Network Mobility (NEMO) is used, the mobile node
establishes a session with the corresponding node and the SIP Network
Mobility Server (SIP-NMS) - which can be seen as the multihomed gateway of
the mobile network - registers this session in its session list. The status of each
session of the list is controlled using the real-time signalling received from MIH.
This way, when an event occurs, such as the progressive degradation of the
used network, the SIP-NMS receives and checks if there is any existing session
using the affected interface, if so, it can determine the most suitable alternative
interface based on session information. After a new interface is selected, the
SIP-NMS sends an INVITE request and re-registers itself with the URI of the
selected interface.
Another proposal based on SIP was introduced in [145] and aims to combine
SIP and HIP capabilities to provide a full mobility management for services
between heterogeneous wireless IP networks. The proposed hybrid SIP-HIP
scheme proposed works for all services and not only for applications that
use SIP sessions. Moreover, according to the authors [145], Hybrid SIP and
HIP (SHIP), comparing with SIP, has better performance in handover’s signalling,
whereas its signalling overhead is smaller.
3.5 multihoming and multipath solutions for communication redundancy 95
In addition to the previous proposals, in [146] an approach for exploiting
mobile multihomed terminals based on SIP and Shim6 is proposed. In
order to do so, the authors of this paper [146] propose the combination
of Shim6 multihoming protocol with the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)
[147] architecture. These two technologies provide seamless handovers and
multimedia session with QoS respectively. Thus, this proposal enhances the
Shim6 handover process by deploying a session renegotiation based on SIP which
ensures the QoS of the service.
Strawman architecture
For the splitting of an application flow across several physical layers
the Strawman architecture was proposed [148]. Unlike other multihoming
proposals, the Strawman architecture works in the session layer. This way, the
application flow can be (de)multiplexed in different transport instances using
one or multiple interfaces. One of the main advantages of this proposal is
that the multihoming support can be provided without any specific transport
protocol. Another significant advantage is that the Strawman architecture could
select the most suitable underlying transport protocol to work with, in order to
achieve the service’s requirements (reliability, throughput...) of the application
layer.
Multipath Real-Time Transport Protocol
Multipath Real-time Transport Protocol (MPRTP) [149] is an extension of the
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [150] protocol that enables the use of
multiple interfaces by creating concurrently different RTP flows through them,
as it is illustrated in Figure 3.21. MPRTP, equally to RTP, is a protocol which
works above the transport layer and used mainly by multimedia applications
(see Figure 3.22). This protocol has been designed using many of the knowledge
acquired in the deployment of MPTCP. It pays special attention in the backwards
compatibility, for both, the legacy applications and existing network elements
such as NATs and firewalls. In order to do so, MPRTP creates a well formed RTP
flow through each interface. Thus, for the network middle-boxes, MPRTP traffic
acts as a regular RTP one.
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Figure 3.21.: Comparison between traditional RTP flow and Multipath RTP
Two valid ways for session signalling are available in MPRTP: in-band and
out-of-band signalling. Within this signalling, MPRTP nodes exchange, among
other data, the available interfaces of each node. In-band signalling refers to
the use of RTP mechanisms for exchanging this information. In this case, the
Real-time Control Protocol (RTCP) header must be extended. By contrary, out-
of-band signalling refers to the use of a separate signalling connection (via SIP,
RTSP, or HTTP) to exchange interface information.
For the data delivery, as MPRTP splits the traffic across multiple interfaces,
RTP header is extended to allow subflow-specific sequence numbers to help
calculating fractional losses, jitter, RTT, etc, in order to ease path selection, load
balancing and fault tolerance decisions.
Figure 3.22.: Comparison between traditional RTP and Multipath RTP protocol stack
The MPRTP layer performs the following functions:
• Path Management - The layer is aware of alternate paths to the other
host, enabling the end-host to transmit differently marked packets along
separate paths. MPRTP also manages the port and IP address pair bindings
for each subflow to send and receive data.
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• Packet Scheduling - The layer splits a single RTP flow into multiple
subflows. This load splitting can be done different scheduling approaches
(load balancing, fault tolerance, etc).
• Subflow recombination - The layer creates the original stream by
recombining the independent subflows. Thus, the multipath delivery is
transparent for upper layers.
Multipath Real-Time Transport Protocol Based on Application-Level Relay(MPRTP-AR)
Another proposal to provide multipath support for multimedia applications is
named MPRTP-AR [151]. This protocol is based on the framework of Multipath
Transport System based on Application-level Relay (MPTS-AR) [152], which can
provide multipath support for many application scenarios, including point-to-
point, many-to-one and one-to-many communications.
MPRTP-AR protocol is located between the transport and application layers
and it consists of two sublayers: the RTP sublayer and the Multipath Transport
Control (MPTC) sublayer. As it is shown in Figure 3.23 the MPRTP-AR architecture
is fully compatible with the existing RTP applications, as it makes use of the
same API. Unlike MPRTP, MPRTP-AR makes use of intermediate entities, named
RTP relay nodes (see Figure 3.24), for creating multiple relay paths between the
sender and the receiver.
Figure 3.23.: Comparison between traditional RTP and MPRTP-AR protocol stack
The MPTC sublayer provides all functions related with multipath support,
such as the path management, the flow splitting, subflow reporting, which
is used to control the path state. This sublayer formats RTP packets into
MPRTP-AR data packets adding a MPRTP-AR header. As this proposal introduces
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the capability to delivery RTP packets through different paths, Subflow-Specific
Sequence Number (SSSN) must be introduced. Additionally, a mechanism for
controlling alive paths, based on keep-alive packets, is used.
Figure 3.24.: A point-to-point MPRTP-AR session
When multiple subflows are used in MPRTP-AR, the flow partitioning can be
performed based on payload coding scheme or path characteristics, adapting
the scheduling to the requirements of the application layer.
Requirements Analysis of Layer 5 proposals
As it is depicted in Table 3.10, all described proposals share some characteristics
as they all work in the layer 5 of the TCP/IP protocol stack. For example, they
all are compatible with network middle-boxes, because these elements usually
analyse the network traffic until the transport layer omitting any checking
to upper layers’ information. Moreover, for the MPRTP and MPRTP-AR cases,
they transmit regular RTP flows along the network, so their functionalities
are transparent for network elements. All these proposals have an end-to-
end approach in their design, except MPRTP-AR, which delegates the multipath
functionality to intermediate application relays. Strawman architecture, MPRTP
and MPRTP-AR have been designed to provide multipath support. By contrary,
SIP does not provide multipath nor multihoming support, but it eases the
implementation of other underlying multihoming protocols, such as HIP or
Shim6, by providing new method for updating locator-identifier association.
All analysed proposals incorporate mechanisms to be aware of the path state.
However, in terms of security, none of them provides any security mechanism
to prevent session hijacking. It is worth noting that, in the case of MPRTP and
MPRTP-AR, it is expected to analyse their security implication but at the time
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of writing these lines this work was not made. From the translucency point
of view, both the wireless technology agnosticism and the legacy application
compatibility requirements are fulfilled by all proposals. These compatibilities
are fulfilled thanks to the use of standard API, on the one hand, and for using
standard TCP or UDP protocols in the transport layer, on the other.
Described SIP-based proposals do not introduce capabilities to define differ-
ent delivery policies, but it facilitates the dynamical interface configuration
to underlying protocols. These proposals do not provide loss detection and
retransmission functionalities, as they rely on the transport layer for this
goal, neither backwards compatibility. SIP is a mature standard widely used
on the Internet, mainly for multimedia applications, but the proposals that
integrate SIP with multihoming protocols are not standardised so they cannot
be considered mature. In summary, the RRE value for SIP-based proposals is
described with the following vector (14):
RRESIP : {2, 1, X, 1, X, 1, 2, 0} (14)
The Strawman architecture, unlike SIP-based proposals, provides the
possibility to decide the delivery policy depending on the requirements that
are expected to be fulfilled e.g. throughput, reliability, etc. Similar to SIP-based
proposals, the Strawman architecture is able to dynamically configure interfaces
but it does not provide loss detection and retransmission mechanisms. This
architecture must be implemented in both sides in order to be able to assemble
the traffic, which has been split in different subflows. However, it does not
deploy any negotiation to decide whether the architecture will be use or not.
Thus, it is not backward compatible. This proposal was presented in 2006 and,
as it illustrates the graph of Figure 3.25, since then, no other paper has been
published. Therefore, it cannot be considered a mature proposal. All in all, the
RRE for Strawman architecture can be summarised in the following vector (15):
RREStrawman : {2, 2, X, 1, X, 1, 2, 0} (15)
MPRTP also incorporates a mechanism for the dynamic address configuration,
different delivery policies and loss detection and retransmission mechanism
inherited from regular RTP protocol. In the session establishment between
two MPRTP nodes, they inform each other about their MPRTP capability and if
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both sides do not have multipath support they perform a regular RTP session.
MPRTP is a proposal with great potential but it is still within a definition stage.
Therefore it is too early to be classified as a mature proposal. The RRE value of
this proposal is expressed in the following vector (16):
RREMPRTP : {2, 2, X, 1, X, 2, 2, 1} (16)
MPRTP-AR proposal is similar to MPRTP but it does not provide flexibility
to implement different delivery policies, nor dynamic interface configuration.
This proposal also provides loss detection and retransmission mechanism
inherited from RTP and it is backward compatible with legacy RTP nodes. Like
MPRTP, MPRTP-AR is still under definition at very early stage, so many points
of its design are open. Therefore, the RRE analysis for this proposal can be
summarised in the next vector (17):
RREMPRTP−AR : {1, 1, X, 0, X, 2, 2, 1} (17)
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Requirements
Layer 5 proposals
SIP-based
solutions
Strawman
architecture
MPRTP
MPRTP-
AR
General for
resilience
Specific for
a redundant
protocol
Connectivity &
association (CA)
End-to-end
approach
3 3 3 7
Middle-box com-
patibility
3 3 3 3
Redundancy (R)
Redundancy ca-
pabilities
3 3 3 3
Flexibility
of different
delivery policies
7 3 3 7
Diversity (Di) Path diversity - - - -
Self protection &
security (SS)
Dynamical inter-
faces/addresses
configuration
3 3 3 7
Security 7 7 7 7
Multilevel
resilience (M)
Multilevel
resilience
- - - -
Context
awareness (CA)
Path state notion 3 3 3 3
Loss
detection and
retransmission
7 7 3 3
Translucency (T)
Wireless technol-
ogy agnosticism
3 3 3 3
Application com-
patibility
3 3 3 3
Additional
implementation
requirements (A)
Backward
compatibility
7 7 3 3
Maturity 7 7 7 7
Table 3.10.: Requirement analysis of Layer 5 proposals
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3.6 summary and conclusion
In this chapter a comparison between different approaches and protocols to
provide resilience to end-to-end communications has been done. Within this
evaluation the RRE vector is defined in order to make a qualitative analysis. Each
technology, designed to work at different OSI levels, has been evaluated under
this vector. In order to turn this qualitative analysis into a measurable semi-
quantitative analysis of all evaluated technologies (and taking into account that
both, diversity and multilevel diversity, have been placed out of the scope of an
end-to-end communication protocol) an equal value of 112 has been assigned to
each RRE vector field.
Based on this semi-quantitative evaluation, the comparison between all
protocols is summarised in Figure 3.26.
Figure 3.26.: Evaluation of the State of the Art
In conclusion, as a result of the analysis it can be concluded that the
most interesting protocol for providing resilience for ERTMS train-to-ground
communications is the protocol MPTCP, which operates in the transport layer.
This protocol is a generic proposal which is not specifically designed for the
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railway domain. On the one hand, this is a positive point because allows the
industry to use a standard facility with a bigger market, this way decreasing
the developing and deploying costs and using an open and potentially common
interface for creating manufacturer interoperable equipments. On the other
hand, MPTCP has not been designed taking into account the specific railway
requirements in terms of maximum delay time and survivability against
channel disruptions. However, this protocol provides an open architecture
which facilitates the design and deployment of different schedulers and
protocol configuration that can be adapted to these requirements.
Although in the literature several research efforts have been carried out
for defining the most suitable communication protocol stack for IP-based
ERTMS traffic, none of them had evaluated the potentiality of exploiting the
multihoming and multipath approaches for improving the resilience of this
traffic before we submitted our proposal in 2013, which was published in 2014
[14].
However, when talking about the adoption of MPTCP as carrier protocol
for ERTMS traffic, some detected limitations must be overcome. One of these
shortcomings is the fact that MPTCP only provides resilience when multiple
used interfaces operate at different frequency channels or under different
transmission mediums. However, in the short-term and mid-term, both,
multihomed and single interface railway elements, will coexist. This means
that the improvements in terms of resilience should not be reserved only for
multihomed equipments. Another shortcoming is that each of ERTMS traffics
described in Chapter 2, regular and HP messages should be treated differently,
applying different schedulers which will increase the resilience depending on
the robustness aimed for each of these two traffics.
This research work aims to make a step forward in this field providing a new
backward compatible protocol stack for the NGERTMS based on MPTCP.
Part III
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laburpena
Atal honetan, lehenengo zatiak detektatutako mugak kontutan hartuz eta protokolo
erredundanteen artearen egoera aztertu eta gero, MPTCP protokoloan oinarritutako
komunikazio arkitektura berria proposatzen da, MP-CFM. Proposamen honek, muga
horiek gainditzearen erronka betetzeaz gain, UNISIG orain dela gutxi plazaratutako
arkitekturarekin atzerakako bateragarritasuna ere bermatzen du. Arkitektura honek
lau zerbitzu klase mota inplementatzen ditu, bi zerbitzu mota lehentasun handiko
mezuentzat eta beste bi lehentasun normaleko mezuentzat. Halaber, horietako bi OBUa
eta RBCa interfaze aniztunak diren eszenatokietarako diseinatuak daude, eta beste biak
RBCa interfaze aniztuna den, baina OBUa interfaze bakarrekoa den eszenatokietarako.
Horrez gain, atal honetan MP-CFMren segurtasunaren ikuspuntutik ere azterketa
bat egiten da. Azterketa honetan segurtasun arazo batzuk detektatzen dira eta horiek
gainditzeko, ERTMSen aplikatzerakoan bete beharreko neurriak proposatzen dira.
Azkenik, kontzeptu proba bat aurkezten da zeinak MP-CFMren eta sarearen arteko
sinbiosia bilatzen duen. Horretarako sarean PCE bat kokatuko litzateke, MPTCPren
azpi-fluxu bakoitzarentzat bide ezberdinak kalkulatuko lituzkeena eta informazio hori
automatikoki MPLS sare batean banatuko lukeena.
resumen
En este apartado, considerando los desafíos previamente descritos en el segundo
apartado y tras analizar el estado del arte en protocolos redundante, se propone una
arquitectura de comunicaciones basada en el protocolo MPTCP, llamada MP-CFM,
que permite superar dichos desafíos, a la par que mantener la retrocompatibilidad con el
sistema de comunicaciones basado en conmutación de paquetes recientemente propuesto
por UNISIG. Esta arquitectura implementa cuatro tipos de clase de servicio, los cuales
son utilizados por los paquetes ordinarios y de alta prioridad para dos escenarios
distintos; un escenario en el que ambos extremos, el OBU y el RBC, disponen de
múltiples interfaces de red; y otro escenario transicional en el cual el RBC sí tiene
múltiples interfaces de red pero el OBU solo dispone de una única interfaz. Además
se hace un análisis del MP-CFM desde el punto de vista de seguridad, detectándose
posibles problemas para los cuales se propone una solución que debería ser adoptada
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junto con la inclusión de MP-CFM en la pila de protocolos de ERTMS. Asimismo, se
presenta una prueba de concepto que permitiría establecer una simbiosis entre MP-CFM
y la red de comunicaciones mediante un PCE situado en esta última que calcule caminos
disjuntos para cada subflujo establecido y distribuya esta información automáticamente
a lo largo de una red MPLS.
Part V
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laburpena
Tesiaren azkenengo atal honetan bertan aurkeztutako ikerketa lanen gainean errepaso
bat egiten da. Azpimarratzekoa da, tesian bildutako proposamen eta emaitza
gehienak inpaktu handiko aldizkarietan eta kongresuetan, nazioartekoak eta nazionalak,
aurkeztuak izan direla. Horrez gain, kongresu eta eztabaida-leku industrialetan ere era
aktiboan hartu da. Bestalde, hemen azaldutako zenbait proposamen, deialdi publikoko
I+G proiektu ezberdinetan (nazioartekoak eta nazionalak) ekarpen moduan aurkeztuak
izan dira.
resumen
En este apartado final de la tesis se hace un repaso de las contribuciones realizadas por
los trabajos de investigación en ella presentadas. Se puede destacar que una gran parte
de las propuestas y resultados de la tesis han sido presentados en numerosas revistas
de alto impacto, congresos nacionales e internacionales y foros industriales ferroviarios.
Además, algunas de las propuestas recogidas en esta tesis han servido como contribución
en múltiples proyectos de I+D nacionales e internacionales financiados en convocatorias
públicas.
10 CONCLUS IONS
The goal of education is the
advancement of knowledge
and the dissemination of
truth.
John F. Kennedy
10.1 introduction
In this chapter we summarise the contributions of this thesis. The work
presented in the previous chapters is aligned with the European plan for
creating a true Single European Railway Area (SERA) in order to improve the
network performance and reliability of the sector as a whole. In this context, the
migration of the communication systems towards TCP/IP technology is essential.
This thesis document is the synthesis of a research work carried out along
the last four years. During this timespan multiple contributions have been
made which will be available for the plan mentioned above. The results of this
research work have been presented in many academic and industrial journals
and conferences. Moreover, since we proposed a MPTCP-based architecture in
2014 [14], this proposal has been taken as a basis for other researchers in Europe
[208–210] and in Asia [211] to perform their works. In the following sections
we summarise the main contributions of this research work, the dissemination
results, the research projects where we have participated, as well as future
potential research lines to complement our proposal.
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10.2 contributions of this research
As we have demonstrated in previous chapters, the adoption of a MPTCP-based
communication architecture, MP-CFM, is suitable for the NGERTMS. Moreover, its
implementation would provide considerably higher resilience against channel
errors to railway signalling applications.
In the following list, we point out the most significant contributions of this
research work:
• Analysis of the current ERTMS limitations. The revision of the current ERTMS
communication protocol stack made in this work has had as result the
highlighting of its main limitations. This shortcoming evaluation defines
the path that it should be followed in order to strengthen the railway
signalling communications.
• Survey of network redundancy protocols. Within this work we have defined
the redundancy as a cornerstone for achieving communication resilience.
Based on this fact, we have defined ERTMS-specific requirements necessary
to perform a deep analysis of the existing proposals and select the most
suitable one based on a semi-quantitative analysis.
• MPTCP-based communication architecture for NGERTMS. In this research work,
we propose a new communication architecture for NGERTMS, named MP-
CFm! (MP-CFm!), which allows to send regular and HP messages providing
to these last ones higher protection against network errors. Moreover, this
architecture is backward compatible with the already defined PS-based
communication system and it eases the migration to upcoming mobile
technologies.
• Parametrisation of the proposed architecture. In this regard, four different
parametrisations have been proposed and validated. Three of them are
valid for the proposed architecture, whereas the parametrisation made
for the tailoring of TCP can be also applied to the PS-based communication
system of current ERTMS.
• Development of a new simulation framework. For the validation of the
proposed architecture a new simulation framework which allows injecting
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real ETCS-like traffic to simulated railway scenario has been developed.
This framework permits to evaluate new signalling applications and
network protocols in the railway domain reducing on-site testing.
10.3 dissemination of the results
Many of the results presented in this thesis work have been published in several
international journals, in proceedings of international academic conferences, as
well as in international industrial conferences related to the railway domain.
Furthermore, the research work has been aligned with different national and
international research projects related with the research topic. In this section
we enumerate these contributions classifying them in different categories.
10.3.1 Publications in international journals
We have published three articles in two different international journals with
impact factor according to the Journal Citation Report. These journals are in
the Q1 of their scientific topics; telecommunications and transportation science
and technologies.
• A Step Up in European Rail Traffic Management Systems: A Seamless
Fail Recovery Scheme [207].
Journal: IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine (IF: 2.783 in 2016).
Year: 2016.
• Cyber security analysis of the European train control system [13].
Journal: IEEE Communications Magazine (IF: 5.125).
Year: 2015.
• End-to-End Multipath Technology: Enhancing Availability and Reliabil-
ity in Next-Generation Packet-Switched Train Signaling Systems.
Journal: IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine (IF: 2.783).
Year: 2014.
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10.3.2 Publications in proceedings of international conferences
We have also published five papers to the proceedings of international
conferences.
• Exploiting redundancy and path diversity for railway signalling
resiliency [212].
Conference: IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Rail Transporta-
tion (ICIRT).
Year: 2016.
• A multi bearer adaptable communication demonstrator for train-to-
ground IP communication to increase resilience [213].
Conference: International Workshop on Communication Technologies for
Vehicles.
Year: 2016.
• SCADA Systems in the Railway Domain: Enhancing Reliability through
Redundant MultipathTCP [214]
Conference: IEEE 18th International Conference on Intelligent Transporta-
tion Systems (ITSC). Year: 2015.
• Towards a resilient railway communication network against electromag-
netic attacks [173].
Conference: Transport Research Arena (TRA).
Year: 2014.
• Multipath technology to handle mobility and increase resilience in next
generation ERTMS (Invited speaker).
Conference: 5th International Workshop on Communication Technologies
for Vehicles.
Year: 2013.
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10.3.3 Oral communications in industrial conferences
Due to the topic of the thesis and its involvement of the local railway industry
we have made special effort to contribute with our results to different industrial
international conferences.
• Cyber security study of the European Rail Traffic Management System.
Conference: UIC ERTMS Conference.
Year: 2016.
• Defining challenges and opportunities for next-generation train sig-
nalling systems over IP communications (Invited speaker).
Conference: Smart Rail 2014.
Year: 2014.
10.3.4 Other publications related to this PhD thesis
During the last years we have also contribute with other three papers directly
related with the research work presented in this thesis. These papers have been
published in international journals and conferences.
• Eurobalise-Train communication modelling to assess interferences in
railway control signalling systems [215].
Journal: Network Protocols and Algorithms.
Year: 2016.
• Modelling and Simulation of ERTMS for Current and Future Mobile
Technologies [198].
Journal: International Journal of Vehicular Technology.
Year: 2015.
• Towards zero on-site testing: Advanced traffic management & control
systems simulation framework including communication KPIs and
response to failure events [196].
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Conference: IEEE International Symposium on Wireless Vehicular
Communications (WiVeC).
Year: 2014.
10.4 participation in national and interna-tional projects
Along the last four years we have participated in different national and
international research projects related with the research work presented in this
thesis.
• SAREMSIG
Funding entity: Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitive-
ness
Participants: UPV/EHU and CEIT
Duration: 01/1/2014 - 31/12/2017
Main researcher: Marina Aguado
Number of participating researchers: 5
Project budget: 72,300 €
• SECRET (FP7-SEC-2011-1)
Funding entity: European Commission
Participants: 11
Duration: 01-08-2012 - 31-07-2015
Main researcher: Eduardo Jacob
Number of participating researchers: 4
Project budget: 3,059,433.00 €
• Cyber Security on Rails
Funding entity: CAF
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Participants: 2
Duration: 01/11/2015 - 31/10/2016
Main researcher: Marina Aguado
Number of participating researchers: 6
Project budget: 39,870.59 €
• TicTRAS
Funding entity: UPV/EHU
Participants: 1
Duration: 20/12/2013 - 25/12/2017
Main researcher: Marina Aguado
Number of participating researchers: 6
Project budget: 73,636.53 €
• CYRail (EU Project 730843)
Funding entity: European Commission
Participants: 6
Duration: 1/10/2016 - 30/9/2018
Main researcher: Marina Aguado
Number of participating researchers: 4
Project budget: 1,500.000 €
10.5 future research lines
The presented thesis work has contributed to the state of the art of the railway
communications. To move from an experimental proposal to an industrial
implementation, two complementary points discussed in this thesis should
be addressed; the protection of the proposed architecture against the security
threats identified in Chapter 5 and the establishment of completely disjoint
subflows introduced in Chapter 6. These two open points define the future
research directions:
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• The substitution of Euroradio Safety layer by the TLS algorithm and
its integration with the proposed MPTCP-based architecture will help to
protect all subflows of the connection against different security attacks.
• The effects of the adoption of more robust cryptographic algorithms,
based on public or private key schemes will be evaluated, specially the
impact of this algorithm in the ERTMS communications delay.
• The integration of the proposed MPTCP-based architecture with MPLS
backbone networks used for railway signalling communications will be
developed. In order to do so, we will continue with an ongoing research
work aligned with the strategy presented in Chapter 6, which is based
on the deployment of a smart ETCS application which will work together
with a network PCE. This strategy will allow creating synergies between
end-hosts and the network exploiting the MPLS TE capabilities to provide
path diversity.
Part VI
APPEND IX

A APPEND IX : CYBER SECUR I TYTHREATS : A TAXONOMYa.1 introduction
This appendix provides taxonomy of cyber security attacks in the general
Information Technology (IT) domain. These cyber attacks can be classified
according to their interaction with the target, their goal and the methodology
used during the attack.
a.2 passive attacks
These types of attacks do not require any interaction with the target or the
network under attack. Usually, they are difficult to detect and their aim is to
collect information for future, more complex, attacks.
• Eavesdropping: This is the most common type of passive attack and it is
performed by capturing packets travelling along the network. This attack
can be performed in both wireless networks and wired networks that are
not correctly segmented.
a.3 active attacks
Unlike the passive attacks, these attacks interact directly with the target or
with the network in order to cause intentional malfunctioning. These attacks
are therefore more easily detected but also more dangerous.
• DoS attacks: As their name indicates, the goal of these attacks is to put
the target out of service, usually by making the target work beyond its
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capabilities. Depending on how the attack is performed, DoS attacks can
be classified into different groups. They can be categorised into physical
and logical attacks, but they can also be defined according to the origin
of the attack, i.e. whether the attack has one or multiple sources:
– Physical attacks (jamming): Jamming attacks do not require
any logic or knowledge of the target andor its network. The
attack occurs when physical conditions that are able to interrupt
communication are introduced into the network. For example, high-
power electromagnetic emissions can abruptly reduce the Signal to
Noise Ratio (SNR) in the target’s receptor.
– Logical attacks: The execution of these attacks requires exhaustive
knowledge of the target’s system, or of the network topology where
it is located. Usually, these attacks – also called replay attacks – are
based on the attacker copying valid packets of the service provided
by the target and inserting these extra copies into the network. This
action causes a data overflow in the target.
– Distributed attacks: When a DoS attack has more than a single
source it is called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). DDoS attacks
can be identical to the regular DoS attacks, but by carrying out the
attack from different sources, the probability of success increases
considerably. Moreover, as there are multiple sources, it is more
difficult for the target to recover from the attack.
• Identity theft or spoofing attacks: These attacks permit the injection
of packets into an unauthorised network by adopting the identity of
an entity that is authorised by the network. When this identity theft is
performed in both communication directions, it is called a "man-in-the-
middle" attack; i.e. attacker C alters communication between entities A
and B, by communicating with A as if they were B and at the same time
communicating with B as if they were A.
• Equipment infection: The exploitation of known or unknown system
vulnerabilities using viruses has become a common and effective means
of cyber war. Cases such as StuxNet have demonstrated that incorrectly
isolated industrial equipment can become a target. It is difficult to protect
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industrial equipment against these attacks for two main reasons. Firstly,
it is difficult to update such equipment in cases where the elements are
geographically dispersed or where they are based on embedded systems.
Secondly, protective software, such as antivirus software, has a negative
effect on real-time performance.
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